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Zusammenfassung 
Schlüsselmanagement ist ein grundlegender Sicherheitsdienst, um sichere drahtlose Ad 
Hoc Netze (WAHN) zu ermöglichen. Bestehende Schlüsselmanagementlösungen, 
basierend entweder auf Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) oder auf Key Pre-distribution 
Scheme (KPS), haben Beschränkungen für WAHNs.   
Wir entwickeln erstens die Hybrid Key Management Infrastructure (HKMI) für 
WAHNs, welche die PKI um Trust- und Kooperationsprotokolle ergänzt, um eine 
leistungsfähige Sicherheitslösung zu konstruieren.   
Wir entwickeln zweitens das Deterministic Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme 
(DPKPS) für großangelegte dynamische WAHNs, die aus Geräten mit beschränkten 
Ressourcen bestehen. Das DPKPS verwendet ein kombinatorisches Design für die 
Vorverteilung mehrerer zweidimensionaler polynomieller Anteile an die WAHN-
Knoten. 
Zukünftige Arbeit umfasst die weitere Verbesserung der Widerstandsfähigkeit des 
DPKPS, die Entwicklung einer Schlüsselmanagementinfrastruktur auf der Grundlage 
von DPKPS, den Entwurf DPKPS-basierter Zugriffskontrollsysteme, und die 
Integration der HKMI mit DPKPS in eine einheitliche Schlüsselmanagementarchitektur.
Abstract 
Key management is a fundamental security service to enable secure wireless ad hoc 
networks (WAHN). To date existing key management solutions based on either public 
key infrastructures (PKI) or key pre-distribution scheme (KPS) exhibit limitations for 
WAHNs. 
We firstly develop the Hybrid Key Management Infrastructure (HKMI) for WAHNs 
composed of moderate-resource devices. The HKMI complements PKI with trust and 
cooperation protocols to construct an performance efficient security solution. 
We secondly develop the Deterministic Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme 
(DPKPS) for large-scale dynamic WAHNs composed of low-resource devices. The 
DPKPS applies a combinatorial design for the pre-distribution of multiple bivariate 
polynomial shares to WAHN nodes. 
Future work comprises further improving the resiliency of the DPKPS, completing a 
key management infrastructure on the basis of the DPKPS, the design of DPKPS-based 
access control mechanisms, and the integration of the HKMI with the DPKPS in a 
unified key management architecture. 
Summary 
Wireless ad hoc networking is the enabling technology for paramount civilian and 
military applications requiring easy and quick (and often unmanned and inexpensive) 
network deployments. Typical (or foreseen) wireless ad hoc network (WAHN) 
applications include disaster recovery, military operation, environment monitoring, 
patient care and patient vital sign monitoring and others. 
A WAHN is a collection of autonomous nodes that communicate with each other by 
forming a single-hop or, often, multi-hop wireless network and by maintaining 
connectivity in a decentralized manner. The network topology is in general dynamic, 
because the connectivity among the nodes varies with itinerant, quitting and joining 
nodes. 
Security is essential for WAHNs. Security services protect the confidentiality, the 
integrity and the authenticity of communications from unauthorized parties attempting 
on legitimate WAHN communications. 
Key management is a fundamental security service, which, by providing and managing 
the basic cryptographic keying material, fundaments security services preserving 
confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. 
The design of key management mechanisms for WAHNs is a particularly complex 
issue. Firstly, because of the lack of an infrastructure (e.g. dedicated servers), WAHNs 
require self-organized key management protocols. Secondly, in order to maximize 
WAHN longevity, because nodes typically run on batteries, energy efficiency is a strict 
requirement in the design of key management mechanisms and protocols. Thirdly, 
WAHN scalability, membership dynamics and sudden changes on network topology 
must be also contemplated in the design of a performance-aware key management 
service. Finally, the operational requirements and the use model of WAHN applications 
need to be considered to design consistent key management systems. 
To date there exist two relevant key management concepts for WAHNs: public key 
infrastructure (PKI) and key pre-distribution scheme (KPS). PKIs can be applied to 
dynamic WAHNs of powerful computing nodes (such as Laptops). However, the 
expensive (both computationally and timely) modular exponentiations required by 
public key operations and the excessive length of messages exchanged by public key-
based protocols hinders successful deployment of PKI-only based security for WAHNs 
of moderate-resource devices (such as mobile phones, PDAs and other embedded 
computing systems). 
In low-bandwidth large-scale WAHNs of low-cost low-resource nodes, public key 
cryptography is strictly prohibited and cooperative security is neither robust nor 
scalable. In this context, to date key management systems base on KPSs because key 
pre-distribution enables nodes to establish lightweight1 symmetric keys without online 
trusted server support. 
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 With associated energy and time efficiency properties. 
The majority of the existing KPSs for large-scale WAHNs relax KPS connectivity for 
resiliency and network size scalability and, thus, cannot generally be applied to dynamic 
WAHNs. Additionally, these schemes make use of third-party collaborative protocols, 
which imply a significant reduction of energy efficiency and security robustness. On the 
other hand, existing KPSs enabling direct key establishment solve the third-party 
involved problems but fail to provide authentication in an performance-aware manner. 
In the first part of this thesis we solve the limitations of PKI in the context of WAHNs 
composed of moderate-resource devices. Our solution, the Hybrid Key Management 
Infrastructure (HKMI), complements PKI with trust and cooperation protocols to 
construct a much more performance efficient (in terms of time and energy efficiency) 
security solution. 
Authenticated key establishment is a key process for securing the channel between two 
communicating parties. PKI-based key establishment involves exchanging bulky2 public 
key certificates (typically exceeding 2 Kbits) and expensive public key operations (a 
single RSA digital signature takes around 833 ms. in a moderate 206 MHz processor). 
The results in this thesis show that HKMI can improve the energy consumption and the 
time delay incurred by PKI-based key establishment in up to 3 orders of magnitude. 
This result is of particular relevance for (low bandwidth) WAHNs of moderate-resource 
devices, particularly in applications with strict maximum energy consumption and delay 
restrictions. 
The trade off between security and performance in HKMI is positive, particularly in 
applications with low risk of misbehaving users. However, for WAHN applications with 
a potential risk for node compromise or misbehavior, our solution inherits the well-
known security vulnerabilities of trust and cooperation security protocols. Nonetheless, 
a robust security architecture for such applications requires a node reputation 
mechanism, which can also be employed to enhance the security strength of HKMI. 
In the second part of this thesis we solve the limitations of KPSs for large-scale 
dynamic WAHNs composed of low-resource devices. We present the Deterministic 
Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme (DPKPS), which originally applies a 
combinatorial design for the pre-distribution of multiple bivariate polynomial shares to 
WAHN nodes. The DPKPS is, to date, to the best of our knowledge the only 
performance-aware KPS that enables direct4 authenticated key establishment. 
The parameters of the DPKPS can be tuned to best-fit the security and performance (in 
terms of energy and time efficiency as well as of number of accommodated nodes) 
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 Wireless is a shared a media. Consequently, effective user throughput is mainly restricted by the number 
of active WAHN members (may involve from tens to thousands of nodes) and the capacity of the WAHN 
enabling wireless technology (A maximum of 250 Kbps for ZigBeeTM/082.15.4 or of 1Mbps for 
Bluetooth® v1.0). 
3
 Some applications, such as medical, have strict timing requirements on connectivity establishment. A 
representative target value is in the order of a few milliseconds.   
4
 Just involving the two communicating parties. 
requirements of a particular WAHN application. The DPKPS is equally applicable to 
small, medium or large size WAHNs of resource-constrained fixed or mobile nodes. For 
instance, the DPKPS can be used to accommodate up to 3,997,696 nodes. In such a 
case, each node needs to store just 1 Kbytes of keying material. Two nodes can establish 
a key by merely exchanging 38 bits of data and investing a negligible quantity of their 
battery resource. The DPKPS resists exposure of the keying material when nodes are 
captured. In our example, the attacker needs to selectively attack up to 125 nodes to 
break the security of the distributed keying material. For an attacker who captures nodes 
randomly, breaking the DPKPS results even harder. 
We successfully proved the performance and the practical feasibility of the DPKPS in a 
demonstrator for body sensor networking. Sensor nodes authenticate and establish 
secure communications transparently and unobtrusively to the human user and without 
apparent delays. 
We propose four lines to continue this work. Firstly, future work may concentrate on 
further improving the resiliency of the DPKPS. A second line may contribute on 
completing a key management infrastructure on the basis of the DPKPS. Thirdly, the 
design of DPKPS-based access control mechanisms for mobile sensor networking, 
including role, group and user access control. Finally, a final task may explore the 
integration of the HKMI with the DPKPS in a unified key management architecture for 
WAHNs. 
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1 Introduction and Motivation 
Security is essential for wireless ad hoc networks (WAHN). Security services protect 
the confidentiality, the integrity and the authenticity of communications from 
unauthorized parties attempting on legitimate WAHN communications. Key 
management is an indispensable security service, that, by providing and managing the 
basic cryptographic keying material, fundaments further security services preserving 
confidentiality, integrity and authenticity [31]. 
Wireless ad hoc networking is the enabling technology for paramount civilian and 
military applications requiring easy and quick (and often unmanned and cheap) network 
deployments. Typical (or foreseen) WAHN applications include disaster recovery, 
military operation, environment monitoring, patient care and patient vital sign 
monitoring and others. For instance, a WAHN of medical wireless portable actuators 
(including respirators, infusion pumps, etc.) can be employed to care a patient in an 
intensive care unit. Similarly, a WAHN of wearable wireless vital sign sensors 
(including electrocardiogram, blood pressure, etc.) and mobile wireless display devices 
(such as portable monitors and PDAs) can be employed to monitor patient health in the 
hospital. 
Formally, a wireless ad hoc network (WAHN) is a collection of autonomous nodes that 
communicate with each other by forming a single-hop or, often, multi-hop wireless 
network and by maintaining connectivity in a decentralized manner. Typically, WAHN 
links have less bandwidth than links of a wired network. Each node in a WAHN may 
work both as a host and a router, and the control of the network is distributed among the 
nodes. The network topology is in general dynamic, because the connectivity among the 
nodes may vary with itinerant, quitting and joining nodes [42]. 
Wireless technologies such as IEEE 802.11 and Bluetooth® are increasingly being used 
for security and privacy-sensitive individual, commercial and industrial WAHN 
applications. Early developments on security for wireless technologies were completely 
flawed with security vulnerabilities [43][44] and simple and successful attacks6 have 
been reported (potentially) compromising the security of corporate networks and the 
privacy of individuals. Poor wireless security designs may not only degrade user trust 
on wireless or generate tremendous vendor losses but, since wireless starts to be 
employed in safety-sensitive applications such as medical, they may also crucially affect 
human lives. For instance, consider the effect of an intruder wirelessly switching your 
respirator off, or the effect of somebody wirelessly modifying your electrocardiogram 
from a normal to a flat signal during an operation. 
IEEE reacted in June 2004 by approving the security standard IEEE 802.11i, which 
aims at mending previous flaws of 802.11 particularly for wireless access to 
infrastructure networks. ZigBeeTM, a new emerging wireless technology for low-cost 
low-power nodes, is specifying lightweight security for simple WAHN applications 
[46]. However, WAHN applications requiring performance-aware security solutions 
remain yet uncovered by 802.11i, Bluetooth and ZigBee. 
                                                 
6
 Just try searching for “WLAN hacking” or “WLAN security” in your favorite Internet search engine. 
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Because of its central role in security, research on key management for WAHNs, 
particularly on key initialization and establishment, is an active research area. For 
instance, the pioneering work of Stajano and Anderson [46] analyzed and elegantly 
solved the problem of bootstrapping security between devices of small-scale WAHNs. 
Subsequently, there has also been a generous bunch of excellent proposals to adapt 
public key infrastructures (PKI) to WAHNs [6]-[15]. In the recent years, because of the 
boom of sensor networks, key pre-distribution schemes (KPS) aim at solving the 
problem of bootstrapping security in large-scale WAHNs of static resource-constrained 
nodes [20]-[30]. Nowadays, researchers are solving the same problem in large-scale 
WAHNs with tight operational requirements and node resource constraints.  
We originally included the problems of mobility, network dynamics and partitions to 
the design of a consistent KPS [2][3]. This fills the gaps left by previous KPS proposals, 
which broadly considered large-scale low-resource WAHNs to be static and wide-
connected. 
The design of key management mechanisms for WAHNs is a particularly complex 
issue. Because of the lack of an infrastructure (e.g. dedicated servers) supporting such 
an essential security service, WAHNs require self-organized and, often, cooperative key 
management protocols. A cooperative design, in turn, demands to thoroughly update the 
models of trust and threat previously considered for infrastructure-based networks. 
In order to maximize WAHN longevity (e.g. when nodes are deployed in remote areas), 
because nodes typically run on batteries, energy efficiency is a strict requirement in the 
design of any WAHN system and protocol, particularly, of key management 
mechanisms and protocols. In some cases a cooperative key management service can 
help reducing energy cost of establishing keys (see Chapter 3). In other cases, direct key 
establishment results in a much more energy preserving solution (see Chapter 4). 
A WAHN may be composed of tens, hundreds or thousands of nodes. In typical WAHN 
applications, nodes move autonomously and may, therefore, continually join or quit the 
WAHN. Additionally, the WAHN may divide in two or more subsets of nodes leading 
to, consequently, isolated nodes and/or subsequently unavailable network services. 
Thus, WAHN scalability, membership dynamics and sudden changes on network 
topology must also be considered to design a consistent performance-aware key 
management service. 
Finally, the operational requirements and the use model of WAHN applications need to 
be considered to design corresponding and satisfying security. For instance, in 
applications where the devices belong to the same administration and are carried or 
worn by human users, cooperative security may be used to design performance-aware 
security protocols (see Chapter 3). Conversely, in applications where nodes are left 
unattended in public places, an uncooperative security design minimizes the 
vulnerabilities arising from exposed nodes (see Chapter 4). 
Our thesis is that in WAHNs the most adequate key management service enables any 
pair of nodes to establish a key independently of any dedicated security server and in a 
performance-aware fashion, i.e. it is flexible to WAHN dynamics and fulfills WAHN 
energy efficiency requirements. In this thesis, we mainly focus on key initialization and 
establishment in WAHNs. 
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In our research for key management mechanisms for WAHNs we find PKI and KPS the 
two main concepts in line with our thesis, which we extensively revise and evaluate in 
Chapter 2. 
PKIs can be applied to dynamic WAHNs of moderate (or powerful) computing nodes. 
However, because public key operations demand computationally expensive modular 
exponentiation and because messages exchanged by public key-based protocols are 
excessively large, PKIs do not result in an optimized energy efficient solution in 
WAHNs (see Chapters 2 and 3). 
In Chapter 3, our Hybrid Key Management Infrastructure (HKMI) exploits cooperative 
trust to solve the energy limitations of PKIs in WAHNs of moderate computing nodes. 
In low-bandwidth WAHNs of inexpensive (typically no tamper-resistant) and resource 
constrained (little memory space, low CPU power and short battery life) nodes, public 
key cryptography is prohibited and cooperative security is neither robust nor scalable 
(see Chapters 2 and 4). In this context, because KPSs enable nodes to establish 
lightweight symmetric keys without online trusted server support, to date KPS-based 
security emerges as the best alternative. However, because existing KPSs for large-scale 
WAHNs typically relax KPS connectivity for resiliency and network size scalability, 
they cannot generally be applied to dynamic WAHNs (see Chapter 2). 
In Chapter 4, our Deterministic Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme (DPKPS), 
especially conceived for large-scale WAHNs of inexpensive and resource constrained 
mobile nodes, is, to the best of our knowledge, the first KPS proposal for WAHNs 
designed with independence of network connectivity and node density assumptions. It is 
thus equally applicable to dynamic WAHNs of small, medium or large size. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 thoroughly reviews and 
evaluates PKIs and KPSs in the WAHN domain. We present and evaluate our solution 
to improve WAHN PKIs in Chapter 3. Our novel DPKPS is presented, evaluated and 
implemented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 shows a DPKPS demonstrator for medical body 
sensor networks. Finally, we conclude this thesis and draw future lines of work in 
Chapter 6. 
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2 Key Management Approaches for WAHNs 
In this section, we review and evaluate the literature on key management for WAHNs. 
Further assessments on key management approaches for WAHNs can also be found in 
[1][2][3]. Other surveys on a broad range of security aspects for WAHNs can be found 
in [30][38][39][40][41]. 
To fully appreciate the contents of this chapter we strongly recommend the reader to get 
familiar with the basics of cryptography and network security. For a simple yet 
excellent introduction to cryptography we refer the reader to [35]. For a broader 
coverage yet structured perspective on security we refer the reader to [16]. For a deep 
and scientific view on cryptography and security refer to the ever masterpiece, the 
Handbook of Applied Cryptography [31]. We also suggest a primer on the 
idiosyncrasies of ad hoc and sensor networking [36][37]. 
In section 2.1 we briefly introduce the concept and objectives of key management. 
Section 2.2 introduces the requirements imposed by WAHNs on key management. In 
section 2.3, we review server based key management concepts. In Section 2.4, we 
evaluate public key infrastructures for WAHNs. Section 2.5 reviews and evaluates key 
pre-distribution schemes. The summary and conclusions of this chapter are presented in 
Section 2.6. 
2.1 Key Management 
Key management is defined as “the set of techniques and procedures supporting key 
establishment and the maintenance of keying relationships between authorized parties”. 
Key management sets the fundament for securing cryptographic techniques providing 
data confidentiality and integrity, entity and data authentication, and digital signatures 
[31]. 
In a generic communication system where two or more parties may communicate, key 
management implements (a set of) the following processes and mechanisms: 
(a) Initialization of system users within a security domain (e.g. by registering a 
user identity in a security server), 
(b) Generation, distribution and installation of keying material (e.g. loading of 
the symmetric key or the public/private key pair and corresponding public 
key certificate of a user into the user’s computer), 
(c) Controlling the use of keying material (e.g. intended cryptographic use of a 
key), 
(d) Update, revocation and destruction of keying material, 
(e) Storage, backup/recovery and archival of keying material. 
Key establishment is “any process whereby a shared secret key becomes available to 
two or more parties” [31]. Assuming two parties A and B initialized in a security 
domain and provided with initial keying material, there are two models of key 
establishment: 
1. Direct. Both parties establish a key communicating directly. 
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A B
K
 
2. Centralized. A trusted third party (TTP) generates and distributes a key to 
both parties. 
A B
K
TTP
K
 
3. Translated. Firstly, one of the parties, A or B, generates and distributes a key 
to the TTP. Then, the TTP forwards the key to the other party, B or A. 
A B
K
TTP
K
 
Direct key establishment is enabled by KPSs and by PKIs. In KPSs, users are initially 
provided with one or a set of shared symmetric keys. One (or a subset) of keys can be 
employed to establish a key in a process conforming to model (1). In PKIs, typically 
users are initially provided with a public/private key pair and a public key certificate. 
The public/private key pair and the certificate can be employed to establish a key in a 
process conforming to model (1). 
In centralized key management each user is initially provided with an exclusive 
long-term symmetric key shared with the TTP. The long-term symmetric key is used to 
establish a key in a process conforming to model (2). 
Translated key management is an extension of model (1). In this model, A and B may 
not directly share a common key. Therefore, they need to use TTP as an intermediary to 
establish a key. Alternatively, A and B may share keying material enabling direct key 
establishment. However, they rather use the TTP as an intermediary. 
The advantages of centralized key management are threefold. Firstly, each user only 
needs to store a long-term symmetric key. This property is of particular relevance in 
applications with devices with scarce memory resources. Secondly, it enables simple 
key control and revocation. Thirdly, keying material of a user A is totally uncorrelated 
with keying material of any other system user. This property is of particular relevance in 
applications with no tamper-resistant devices. 
Nonetheless, the following disadvantages of centralized key management hinder their 
successful deployment for WAHNs: 
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 The TTP needs to be online during the key establishment process, 
 potential loss of communication system security, if TTP is compromised, 
 performance bottleneck, if TTP is overloaded with requests, 
 loss of service availability, if TTP fails. 
Decentralized key management, enabled by PKIs or KPSs, solves the limitations of the 
centralized approach. The key establishment processes can be executed directly, i.e. 
independently from TTPs.  
However, traditional public key cryptography demands exponential modular operations 
with large numbers. These operations are unfeasible in strict resource constrained 
devices with extremely low-power CPU and little RAM space. Additionally, because 
the length of public keys and certificates is over the 1 Kbytes, public key-based protocol 
messages get excessively large for low-cost low-bandwidth WAHNs. 
KPSs appear to date as an interesting alternative to PKI for low-cost low-bandwidth 
WAHNs. However, existing KPSs do not scale to a large number of users unless 
security trade-offs are accepted in the target application.  
A last issue of decentralized key management, where no TTP holds the responsibility 
for system security, is key control and revocation. 
In the recent years there have been a great number of research proposals adapting PKIs 
and KPSs to WAHNs. Thus, the state-of-the-art of key management has evolved 
considerably. We extensively review and evaluate the related literature in the rest of the 
chapter. Later in chapters 3 and 4 we will describe our own proposals to address and 
solve some of the performance limitations of PKIs and KPSs in WAHNs, respectively. 
2.2 Requirements of Key Management for WAHNs and Evaluation 
Criteria 
The ad hoc nature of WAHNs makes key management design an interesting research 
problem. To date there exist a large number of proposals trying to solve the problem of 
key management for WAHNs in applications with different restrictions and demands. In 
the following sections, we will mainly consider the following properties to evaluate key 
management techniques for WAHNs: 
 Scalability: the total number N of nodes accommodated by the key management 
technique. In KPSs this parameter is typically limited by the memory available 
on WAHN nodes to store keying material. 
 Resource Performance: computational and communication efficiency level and 
storage requirements on nodes. 
 Feasibility for mobile ad hoc networking: ability to enable performance-aware 
(scalable as well as energy and time efficient) key establishment (and, thus, 
security) in dynamic WAHNs, where WAHN membership and size is a priori 
unknown. 
 Connectivity properties: measures the probability that two nodes can establish a 
pairwise key. A key management technique with perfect connectivity enables 
direct pairwise key establishment.  
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 Security services enabled: one or a combination of confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication and non-repudiation.  
 Robustness: resistance to security attacks (e.g. man-in-the-middle). 
In PKIs, assuming all the nodes can be initiated with one (or more) valid public/private 
key pair(s) and a public key certificate, the scalability is unlimited. That is, any node 
can establish secure communications with an unlimited number of other nodes. 
Additionally, given the same assumptions, the connectivity probability is one. That is, 
any node can establish secure communications with any other node. Therefore, hereafter 
we will not analyze either the scalability or connectivity issues in PKIs. 
2.3 Server-based Infrastructures 
Server-based key management infrastructures are successfully applied in computer 
networks such as company LANs. To date, the most successful instance is the Kerberos 
infrastructure [16]. In a LAN security domain a Kerberos server keeps track of all the 
LAN nodes and distributes to them symmetric keys and trust information on demand. 
LAN nodes use these symmetric keys to further establish session keys to protect the 
confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of their communications. The trust 
information accompanying a key can also be used to verify access rights of a client node 
demanding access to a server residing at the LAN. 
The Kerberos server can additionally be used to provide online non-repudiation 
services. The Kerberos server stores a log of client/server transactions by trusted clients 
and servers. In case of disputes, client, server and a referee need online access to the 
Kerberos server. 
A centralized non-repudiation service cannot completely be trusted by either the client 
or the server, since the Kerberos server could be compromised by or be favorable to any 
of them. Therefore, applications demanding non-repudiation services often deploy 
decentralized solutions that involve just the client and the server. In addition, a 
decentralized solution (enabled by PKI) is more flexible than centralized solutions 
because client and server can apply trustworthy non-repudiation properties to their 
transactions without requiring online servers. 
Because server-based security is not a viable (or, otherwise, optimal) option in most 
WAHN scenarios, there are few contributions in this research line. Perrig et al. [4] were 
the first authors applying the Kerberos concept in the context of WAHNs of strictly 
resource-constrained nodes. In SPINS [4] each node shares a secret key with a base 
station (BS) (here the BS takes the role of the Kerberos server). The BS resides at the 
WAHN with the rest of the nodes. Any two nodes use the BS to establish a common 
session key. This key can be applied to protect the confidentiality, integrity and/or 
authenticity of the communication. 
Pirzada and McDonald [5] analyze the particular case where WAHN nodes have access 
to a network infrastructure. They propose making use of a group of (Kerberos-like) 
dedicated trusted servers (at the network infrastructure) for WAHN security. The trusted 
servers share a priori a pre-established secret with each end node and with each other 
server. 
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Trusted server-enabled key establishment exhibits some nice properties for WAHN of 
static nodes [1][2][3][30][38][39][40][41]. Firstly, since WAHN nodes are only 
required to store one shared key with the server, it optimizes storage efficiency in nodes. 
Secondly, assuming that the storage space in the server is not an issue, the size of the 
WAHN can indefinitely scale without affecting the storage requirements in nodes. 
Thirdly, since the enabled key establishment protocols uniquely rely on symmetric key 
cryptography, it optimizes computational performance, i.e. energy performance. 
However, a centralized security solution possesses a number of weaknesses that 
severely impede their wide-spread application for WAHNs 
[1][2][3][30][38][39][40][41]. Firstly, if just the security server is compromised, the 
WAHN becomes insecure (i.e. the attacker reads the keys stored in the server and then 
use them to eavesdrop WAHN communications and/or to impersonate WAHN nodes). 
In typical WAHN applications the trusted server is to be left unattended in public 
places. This operational requirement significantly increases the risk of server 
compromise in respect to traditional networking applications. Additionally, WAHN 
nodes use wireless communications to access the security server. Consequently, an 
attacker succeeds in disabling the establishment of new secure communications by 
simply jamming the wireless link to the server. 
Secondly, if the security server is down or it cannot be reached, no new secure 
communications can be established in the WAHN. The latter is a special issue in 
transient WAHNs that are sporadically and suddenly formed by WAHN mobile nodes. 
In some applications nodes erratically wander around a physical area. When two or 
more nodes come into the wireless vicinity of each other, then a WAHN is suddenly 
formed to exchange node information. When the nodes fall apart from each other, the 
WAHN progressively diminishes till it may eventually disappear. Because a large 
number of independent mobile nodes are deployed in the same area, more than one 
transient WAHN coexist in different places within that area. A centralized security 
approach in this context requires a security server to be present at each and every 
WAHN during its complete lifetime. This security system is difficult to realize because 
we ignore at design the location and the quantity of WAHNs. 
Thirdly, centralized key distribution does not pose an energy or time efficient solution 
for large-scale multi-hop WAHNs. In this setting access to the server involves several 
hops between nodes not directly connected to the server.  
A complex and time-consuming process of establishing a trusted routing infrastructure 
is needed to support centralized key distribution. Firstly, the routing nodes directly 
connected to the server establish trust. Then, the rest of routing nodes progressively 
establish secure links. The establishment of this infrastructure is even more complicated 
and energy-expensive in dynamic scenarios. Here, the secure routing infrastructure must 
dynamically update to changes of WAHN membership. 
In a WAHN with progressively increasing membership number and density the power 
of the radio transceivers is automatically tuned down in order to decrease both power 
consumption and interference. This automatic regulation, in turn, further increases the 
number of hops separating distant nodes from the trusted server. Consequently, the 
energy and time cost to distribute a key degrades further. 
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The nodes in the first hops from the server are required to naïvely waste their energy to 
forward every petition to the server. Eventually, they either run out of batteries or they 
better choose not to cooperate. 
In some WAHN applications nodes are configured with strictly low transmission duty 
cycles to save energy (and, thus maximize their longevity) or to conform regulations7. 
In such cases, intermediary nodes add significant delays to the distribution of keys. 
2.4 Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) 
PKIs have a tremendous deployment success in networks such as the Internet. PKI is a 
security architecture that provides trust for exchanging information over insecure 
communication channels. 
In a PKI, each node has a public/private key pair. A private key is different from a 
public key. Although there is a mathematical unequivocal relationship between both 
keys, it is unfeasible to derive the private key from its sibling public key. The private 
key is kept private to its owner, while the public key can be distributed to other nodes.  
The main component of a traditional PKI is the certification authority (CA). The CA is 
a globally (at least for a group nodes) trusted entity to issue and revoke public key 
certificates. The CA generates a public/private key pair for a node (requesting it), after 
verifying the identity of the node. Additionally, the CA provides the node of an 
authentic (i.e. signed under the CA's private key) public key certificate binding its 
identity to its public key. Alternatively, the node generates its own public/private key 
pair and, subsequently, applies for a certificate validating the authenticity of its public 
key. 
Traditionally, the trusted CA stays online to reflect the current public/private key 
bindings. These bindings could change over time for a number of reasons. Firstly, a 
public key should be revoked if the owner node is no longer trusted or is out of the 
network. Secondly, a node may refresh its key pair periodically to reduce the chance of 
a successful brute-force attack on its private key. 
PKI enables authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation services in a 
scalable and flexible way [31]. To authenticate two nodes first exchange their respective 
public key certificates, validate them (i.e. verify the certificate is signed by the trusted 
CA and the certificate has not yet expired), and finally use a public key-based 
authentication protocol to validate their identities. If the CA is online available, a node 
may additionally contact the CA to verify the validity of a communication partner 
certificate. 
After (or concurrently with) authentication, both nodes use a public key-based key 
exchange protocol to establish a symmetric key (typically referred to as session key). 
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This symmetric key is used to efficiently protect the confidentiality and integrity of the 
rest of the conversation. 
The signature of a message (or a file) with a node's private key represents a portable 
node fingerprint on this message (or file). Anybody in possession of the node's certified 
public key can validate its signature. Moreover, given that the private key is a secret 
exclusive to its owner, a node cannot deny having signed a message. 
Certificates can be listed in Directories (another component of the PKI) to ease access to 
a node's public key. 
To date there exist a great deal of proposals [6]-[14][16][17] for setting up PKIs in 
WAHNs. They can be grouped depending on the kind of CA employed: 
1. Offline CA-based PKI, 
2. Online partially distributed CA-based PKI, 
3. Online fully distributed CA-based PKI. 
In the following subsections we will review the specific operational concept of each 
PKI. They can all be used to provide authentication, confidentiality, integrity and non-
repudiation services. 
These proposals were conceived ignoring energy and time issues of WAHNs and, thus, 
they (with different degrees of significance) share common performance limitations for 
a number of reasons. Firstly, public key operations are highly CPU intensive [68]. 
Consequently, abusive (or repetitive) use contributes to quickly exhaust battery-
powered devices. Secondly, because public keys and certificates are large (to date 
accepted size is 1024 bits for a wide-spread RSA key [61]) and public key operations 
are complex, it is unfeasible to timely (and concurrently) handle public key-based 
protocol transactions by nodes with strict CPU and/or RAM limitations. Thirdly, radio 
transmission consumes significant power [68]. Because public key-based protocol 
messages are large (at least one order of magnitude larger than symmetric key based 
protocols8 [61]), devices waste excessive battery resources. Fourthly, because WAHNs 
typically support low-throughput communication channels, a public key-based 
exchange can significantly degrade latency.  
In Chapter 3, we will present the HKMI [1], a key management concept to improve the 
energy and time efficiency of current PKIs for WAHNs of moderate-power devices. 
2.4.1 Offline Certification Authority  
A simple PKI can be enabled with just an offline CA [6][7]. 
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This approach provides each WAHN node with one or more public/private key pairs 
and digital certificates in a bootstrapping phase, i.e. before the actual WAHN exists. 
The CA may additionally associate multiple permissions to each public key, i.e. for 
what a WAHN node is trusted.  
After the bootstrapping phase, when two arbitrary nodes communicate in the WAHN, 
they can authenticate and establish session keys using their public/private key pairs. 
Additionally, they can sign messages (or files).  
After the bootstrapping phase, the CA is not present at the WAHN. Therefore, an 
attacker cannot compromise the private key of the CA by capturing it. Nonetheless, 
since the CA is not addressable anymore, key revocation is not possible without further 
WAHN self-organized control mechanisms, e.g. node reputation mechanisms. 
2.4.2 Online Partially Distributed CA 
The offline CA-based PKI cannot be employed in WAHN applications requiring fresh 
monitoring of the status of public/private key bindings. The obvious alternative is to set 
an online CA at the WAHN. However, a key management service based on a single CA 
exhibits some important problems in WAHNs. Firstly, the CA is a vulnerable point of 
the network, i.e. if the CA is unavailable, nodes cannot verify revocation status of a 
node's public key. Secondly, if the CA is compromised and leaks its private key to an 
adversary, the adversary can then sign any erroneous certificate using this private key to 
impersonate any node or to revoke any certificate. 
A typical approach to improve availability of a service is replication. However, naïve 
replication of the CA makes the key management service even more vulnerable, since 
compromise of any single replica, which possesses the service private key, could lead to 
collapse of the entire system. 
To solve these limitations, a few papers address the use of threshold cryptography to 
distribute CA functionalities to s WAHN nodes denoted servers [8]-[11]. 
A ( )1, +ts  threshold cryptography scheme allows s parties S1, S2...SS to share the ability 
to perform a cryptographic operation (e.g., creating a digital signature). Any t+1 parties 
can perform this operation jointly. However, a number of t or fewer colliding parties 
cannot successfully perform the same operation. 
In distributed CA-based PKI, the CA private key PK is divided into s shares PK1, 
PK2...PKS using ( )1, +ts  threshold cryptography. Each share PKi  is assigned to a server 
Si, for si ...2,1= . 
A number t+1 of partial signatures are needed in the generation of new certificates. For 
the CA to sign a new public key certificate, each server Si generates a partial signature 
for the certificate using its private key share PKi and submits the partial signature9 to 
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one (or t+1)  combiner server(s). With t+1 correct partial signatures, the combiner 
computes the final signature for the certificate.  
In this manner, this approach increases security robustness and availability in the 
presence of security attacks from malicious nodes and compromised nodes. To break 
the key management service, now an attacker needs to expose t+1 servers. 
A number of proposals [11]-[14] discuss previous partially distributed PKI models in 
the context of clustered WAHNs. Cluster heads play the role of server in a WAHN-wide 
distributed CA. Each cluster head issues, renews and revokes public key certificates to 
WAHN nodes within the cluster. 
2.4.3 Online Fully Distributed CA 
In applications with no common trusted entity, the pretty good privacy (PGP) [16][17] 
web-of-trust model allows users themselves to establish trust relationships. In this 
model, trust is not referred to a single or a partially distributed common CA but it is 
progressively built as a chain of trust relationships among all the network users.  
 PGP defines different trust levels (complete, marginal and no-trust) for public keys, i.e. 
for what and how much a node is trusted. For instance, a complete trusted party can be 
trusted to introduce other parties. Imagine three nodes A, B and C, where B and C 
completely trust A, and where B and C do not yet trust each other. After A shows trust 
in B to C and in C to B, then B and C trust marginally each other. After B and C 
satisfactorily exchange some useful data, then they may end up completely trusting each 
other. 
Public/private key bindings and chains of digitally signed certificates can be used to 
realize PGP's trust model. In the previous example, to demonstrate its complete trust in 
node B (or C), A includes its level of trust in B (or in C) and signs B's (or C's) 
certificate with its private key. 
Based on PGP model, Capkun et al. [15] proposed a fully self-organized PKI for 
WAHNs.  The system allows nodes to generate their public/private key pairs and to 
issue certificates to other nodes. Revocation of nodes is also enabled. 
This kind of key management system inherits the security vulnerabilities of fully 
distributed trust models. In particular, since no central trusted CA is controlling which 
nodes are trusted, an attacker may access the network by compromising the private key 
of any of the nodes. Additionally, any node may fail assessing trustworthiness of a new 
node and then sign a certificate for an attacker. Once misbehaving node or an attacker 
possesses a certificate within the web-of-trust, it is straightforward for him to fabricate 
and introduce new identities. 
To try to reduce the risk of these attacks in a WAHN, self-organized PKIs need to be 
complemented with self-organized key revocation and control mechanisms, e.g. node 
reputation mechanisms. 
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2.5 Key Pre-distribution Schemes 
A key pre-distribution scheme (KPS) enables nodes of a WAHN to establish keys 
without requiring online connection to a trusted server.  
As in PKIs with offline CA, during a bootstrapping phase an administrator initializes 
the nodes with some keying material. The interesting (and differential, when compared 
to PKI) aspect of a KPS is that the keying material consists of symmetric keys (or, 
alternatively, information to easily generate symmetric keys [18][19]). 
The computational and communication efficiency of symmetric key protocols together 
with the ability to enable key establishment independently of any server makes KPSs to 
date the only feasible option in typical wireless sensor network (WSN) applications 
[3][30].  
However, the memory restriction of sensor nodes limits the number of keys carried by 
each node. This, in turn, limits the scalability and the resiliency of a KPS. 
In PKI a node just needs to carry its own private key to be able to communicate with an 
unlimited number of users. A KPS is targeted at low-cost low-power WAHN 
applications where public key is prohibitive. Low-cost low-power WAHN are usually 
composed of inexpensive nodes without tamper resistance. In contrast to PKI, to make a 
KPS design scalable we let each node carry a set of symmetric keys shared with several 
other nodes. This leads to a side-effect problem: any exposed node that leaks its keys 
poses a potential compromise of communications between non-exposed nodes.  The 
percentage of potential compromised communications of non-exposed nodes when a 
number NC nodes are exposed is a critical and defining metric of a KPS, hereafter 
referred to as resiliency. For instance, a KPS distributing the same key to all the nodes 
has no resiliency. 
Typically, a KPS enables data confidentiality and integrity services. Further enabling 
authentication service in a performance-aware fashion is a complex issue. 
2.5.1 Generic KPS Model 
All KPSs for WAHNs found in literature [20]-[30][32] can be summarized in a simple 
model. In this section, we discuss the generic model of key pre-distribution in the 
context of low-cost low-power WAHNs. 
2.5.1.1 Set-Up Phase 
The set-up process is typically performed by a system administrator in a secure 
environment distinct to the final location of the WAHN.  
Generally, at this point in time the system administrator has no knowledge of the future 
deployment location of each individual node. Therefore, KPSs are designed to 
maximize the probability that any two nodes can establish a secure connection, after 
they are randomly deployed. 
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The administrator loads keying material (including symmetric keys – or information to 
easily generate symmetric keys – and optionally key and node identifiers) in each 
individual node using a deterministic or random distribution method. 
After the set-up phase, the nodes are randomly spread in a given physical space. Nodes 
form one (or various) WAHNs and manage the WAHN autonomously without requiring 
further human intervention. The area where nodes are deployed is typically of public 
access. Consequently, the KPS needs to be designed to cope with node captures and key 
exposure. 
2.5.1.2 Secure Link Formation 
In most KPSs the keying material carried by nodes consists of a set of distinct 
symmetric keys. In KPSs based on Blom or Blundo KPS the keying material consists of 
encoded keying information from which a pairwise symmetric key can be easily and 
securely derived. In any case, hereafter we assume two nodes have found a common key 
out of their key sets or they have derived a common pairwise key from their encoded 
keying information. 
Assume two nodes with a common key want to communicate. If the common key 
supports node authentication, to establish a secure channel both nodes firstly 
authenticate and then derive a session key. The session key is subsequently used to 
protect the communication channel. Alternatively, if the common key does not support 
node authentication, both nodes may either use the common key as a session key or they 
may derive a session key from the common key. 
Nodes may need to repeatedly re-establish a secure channel because they loose 
connectivity.  
Assuming KPS keys are only used to protect data link layer connections (such is the 
typical case of WSNs), in fixed scenarios a node establishes communication with a 
reduced number of nodes in the same wireless neighborhood. In mobile scenarios, a 
node may encounter and establish a secure wireless link with any other node during the 
node's lifetime. 
2.5.1.3 Secure Communication 
Nodes use the protected communication channel to exchange data. 
2.5.2 Attacker Model 
To assess the security level of a security system (in our case, of a KPS), formal attacker 
models are employed. 
A widespread used attacker model [33] assumes that the attacker may eavesdrop, replay 
or modify any transmitted message. The attacker may also insert forged messages and 
impersonate one or both ends of the conversation. The attacker may additionally act as a 
man-in-the-middle [16]. 
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In some WAHN applications, in which nodes are not tamper-resistant and are left 
unattended in public places, we need to upgrade the attacker model. Now the attacker 
may also physically capture nodes and read the keying material from their memory. An 
attacker who captures nodes randomly is defined as the oblivious attacker. An attacker 
who exploits information acquired in previous captures to selectively capture new nodes 
and, thus, progressively maximize the quantity of new tamper keying material is defined 
as the smart attacker [32]. 
2.5.2.1 KPS Resiliency 
The resiliency of a KPS is defined as the resistance of the KPS against compromise (i.e. 
disclosure) of distributed keying material.  
Assume N WAHN nodes carrying keying material pre-distributed by certain KPS. 
Assume also an attacker possessing capabilities to capture nodes and read the keying 
material stored in them. The resiliency of the KPS against node captures is measured as 
the percentage of communications of non-captured nodes that are compromised (i.e. 
deemed insecure) when a number Nc of nodes are captured [30].  
For instance, assume a WAHN where all the nodes carry the same key k. Now imagine 
a node is captured and its copy of the key is exposed. It is easy to see that any 
communication that any two non-captured nodes may establish with k thereafter is not 
secure anymore. That is, the fraction of compromised communications is 100%. 
2.5.3 System Key Pre-distribution Scheme 
The simplest KPS approach is to pre-load a single symmetric key k into all nodes before 
deployment in the WAHN. 
This approach can be applied to provide simple security in some WAHN applications. 
Two nodes u and v can use k (or a pairwise key kuv derived from k) to encrypt their 
communications. 
The system KPS is optimal on memory cost on nodes because each node only needs to 
store a symmetric key (of e.g. 128 bits). However, because every node possesses the 
same key k, it is not possible to confidently verify the identity of a node in the WAHN, 
i.e. the KPS does not support node unique authentication. The exposure of the key k in 
any of the nodes compromises the rest of communications. 
Zhu et al. [25] proposed to use a system key k to derive pairwise keys during an initial 
phase of sensor node deployment in WSNs. Each node u derives a different pairwise 
key kuv with each node v in wireless range. After this initial phase, each and every the 
node is supposed to erase the system key k from its memory. 
Assuming that no attacker is present at the deployment area during the initial 
deployment phase and that no node fails to erase the system key, this system provides 
perfect resiliency against node captures in the post-initial phase. Otherwise, the attacker 
can capture a node and learn the key k, before the node erases k from its memory. 
Subsequently, the attacker can learn pairwise keys derived by other nodes by simply 
decrypting the handshake used to establish each pairwise key. 
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An important drawback of Zhu's et al. is that new nodes cannot be added to the WAHN, 
after nodes erase the system key. Consequently, it cannot be applied to WAHN 
applications requiring subsequent secure addition of nodes after the initial deployment 
(to for instance replace nodes with exhausted batteries).  
Basagni et al. [27] proposed a key management system for WSNs that periodically 
updates a system key k. The WSN time is divided in regular time periods T1, T2 ...Tn. 
During each time period Ti a new key ki is globally used to protect WAHN 
communications. 
To make the system scalable the WSN is divided into clusters. Each cluster has its own 
cluster head node selected among all the nodes in the cluster. The cluster heads are to 
compose a network backbone for re-keying (and optionally for routing). Among all the 
cluster heads, one is randomly chosen in each and every time period to generate a key 
for the next time period. Subsequently, the new key is distributed from the key manager 
node to the cluster heads and ultimately to the rest of nodes. 
The key ki+1 is generated by applying a one-way10 hash function h on ki. After receiving 
ki+1, the key ki shall be erased from each and every node. In contrast to Zhu et al. 
concept, this scheme enables secure node additions: a new node applies i times the hash 
function on the initial key k to obtain the key ki for the current time period. However, as 
side-effect an attacker learning ki can also easily derive all the keys for the following 
periods. This important security vulnerability restricts Basagni et al. concept only for 
WAHN applications where the attacker can eavesdrop, modify and inject messages but 
cannot physically capture nodes. 
2.5.4 Trivial Key Pre-distribution Scheme 
This KPS pre-distributes a distinct (and statistically independent) pairwise key to each 
pair of nodes of a WAHN [30][31]. For instance, assume a WAHN to be composed of 
three nodes u, v and w. The KPS assigns kuv ,kuw to u; kuv ,kvw to v; and kuw ,kvw to w. 
This approach exhibits perfect resiliency. In the previous example, if u is captured, then 
the keys kuv ,kuw are exposed. Note that none of these keys are used to protect the 
communications between v and w. 
The trivial KPS supports node authentication and direct key establishment in WAHNs. 
Because kuv is a pairwise key exclusively used by the pair of nodes u and v, node u (or v) 
can use kuv to validate the identity of a node claiming to be v (or u). Since u and v share 
kuv, they can use this key to further derive session keys without requiring intermediaries. 
This quality is of special relevance in low-cost low-power WAHN designs because of 
its superior security strength and energy and time efficiency. 
The trivial KPS is not scalable to large number of nodes, given a memory constraint m. 
Each node of an N-node WAHN needs to store N-1 keys. Therefore, the number N is 
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limited by the memory m available in nodes. For instance, a WAHN formed with nodes 
with memory space for 124 keys cannot get larger than 125 nodes. 
2.5.5 Random Key Pre-distribution Schemes 
Eschenauer and Gligor [20] proposed random key pre-distribution for WSNs to improve 
the resiliency of system key KPS and the scalability of a trivial KPS. 
The main idea is to load, before deployment, in each sensor u a subset s of up to m keys 
(called a key ring and hereafter denoted as Ku) randomly picked from a key pool S with 
S  distinct keys. Two nodes share a key with probability ( )( )( ) ! ! 2
! 
1
2
SsS
sS
p
−
−
−= [20]. 
During the post-deployment phase, in order to establish a pairwise key, two sensor 
nodes only need to identify the common keys that they (may) share. 
Chan et al. [21] allow two nodes to setup a pairwise key only when they share at least c 
common keys. The pairwise key of two sensors is calculated as a function of c keys. 
In respect to Eschenauer´s KPS, Chan et al. KPS strengthens the resiliency against 
small-scale node captures while trading off increased vulnerability in the face of 
large-scale attacks. For instance, assume each node carries 200 randomly chosen keys. 
For c = 2, the amount of additional communications compromised when 50 nodes have 
been captured is 4.74%, as opposed to 9.52% for Eschenauer´s KPS. However, when 
more than 125 nodes have been compromised, the c-composite KPS reveals a larger 
fraction of communications. 
The definition of small-scale is fuzzy. In the previous example, small-scale can be 
understood as an attack of up to 125 nodes. For c = 3, small-scale should be understood 
as lower than 80 nodes (according to Figure 2 in [21]). For greater c, the definition of 
small-scale continues shrinking. 
Chan's KPS resiliency grows exponentially with the number of captured nodes, whereas 
Eschenauer's KPS resiliency grows linearly (refer to Figure 2 in [21]). By increasing c, 
it is harder for an attacker to compromise a significant fraction of communications with 
small-scale captures. However, a large-scale attack impacts much more significantly 
with greater c. 
In some WAHN applications Chan's KPS may be preferred to Eschenauer's KPS 
because small-scale attacks are much easier to mount than large-scale attacks. 
Hwang and Kim [24] indicated that allowing a small number of isolated nodes helps 
reducing the required number of keys in a key ring or, alternatively, improving security 
of a random KPS. They also proposed to use dynamic radio power adjustment to 
increase the degree11 of a node when establishing keys. This technique increases the 
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probability of finding nodes with shared keys in the same wireless neighborhood. In 
turn, the probability of having a fully secure connected WAHN also increases. 
Di Pietro et al. [26] applied a geometric model for random key pre-distribution. For a 
WAHN of size N, Di Pietro's KPS distribute s keys to each node. Imagine a unit square 
were the nodes are randomly deployed. The number of keys in the key pool is to be 
calculated as rNNrS log2log2 +≈ , where r is a node's normalized wireless transmission 
range. They claim this approach guarantees a high probability of secure WAHN 
connectivity12 even if s is just two [26]. 
One relevant drawback of the first random KPSs is that random keys cannot be used to 
provide unique authentication [30]. Since key rings contain keys randomly picked from 
the same key pool, more than a pair of nodes may use the same common key to secure 
their communications. Note that unique authentication is of special relevance to support 
access control services and to revoke misbehaving or captured nodes. 
Following, a number of random KPS proposals [21][22][23][29] enable the 
establishment of keys that enable unique authentication. Chan et al. [21] propose to 
randomly pre-distribute unique pairwise keys to each pair of nodes. Du's et al. [22] 
solution combines Blom’s scheme [18] with random key pre-distribution. Liu and Ning 
[23] applied a similar idea with Blundo’s scheme13 [19] (Blundo’s KPS is revised in 
detail in the following subsection and in Chapter 4).  
Similarly, Lee and Stinson [29] combine ( )µλ,,, rm -strongly regular graphs G with a 
modification on the original Blom scheme. This approach splits an N-node population in 
m classes with l nodes each. Each class is associated to a vertex of G. The 2l nodes u1, 
u2,…ul and v1, v2,…vl belonging to two adjacent classes u and v receive keys, which 
enable nodes ui to directly establish keys with nodes vi. To establish a key with nodes of 
the same class, nodes of class u need the help of a node of class v. Since a class u is 
adjacent to r distinct classes, a node in u can establish direct keys with lr ×  nodes. Then, 
assuming random deployment of nodes, two arbitrary nodes can directly establish a key 
with probability ( ) ( )1−×= Nlrpd [28]. Since non-adjacent classes u and v have µ 
classes µccc ,..., 21  in common, a node of class u can indirectly (through one-hop) establish 
a key with nodes of v by using any of the l×µ nodes in µccc ,..., 21 . 
The main drawback of random KPSs is that two arbitrary nodes directly find a common 
key with a given probability p (generally p directly influences the performance of the 
KPS). Thus, neighboring nodes (one or more hops away) are enabled as TTP to assist 
establishing keys to two sensors that do not share a key in their respective key rings 
(this mechanism is referred as path-key establishment in the literature on random KPSs). 
Path-key establishment is limited by the physical connectivity properties of the WAHN. 
The probability of finding a TTP among the neighbors directly depends on the size of 
                                                 
12
 A path of one or more secure links connects almost any two nodes in the WAHN. 
13
 Blundo's scheme is a generalization of Blom's. 
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the neighborhood. A denser node neighborhood increases the probability to establish 
keys but this, in turn, increases interference and decreases user-throughput, i.e. the 
performance of the KPS and the network is traded-off [24]). 
Consider now a WAHN with one or more partitions. In partitions composed of a few 
nodes finding a TTP among the neighbors may result often impossible. 
Additionally, path-key establishment introduces two severe additional security risks in 
WAHNs of unattended nodes. Firstly, since each node u is allowed (and often required) 
to work as a TTP, it becomes a single point of compromise for its trusted nodes (recall 
this is a major vulnerability in server-based security infrastructures, which we try to 
overcome with KPSs) [3]. To minimize this vulnerability the random KPS needs to be 
complemented with an effective and efficient intrusion detection system (IDS). The IDS 
must provide reliable node trust and reputation metrics to reject misbehaving or 
compromised nodes from the WAHN. Additionally, (if possible) nodes should use more 
than one trusted node to establish a path key. This mechanisms however introduces 
further communication and computational overhead. 
Secondly, a single captured node can be used to significantly reduce the resiliency of a 
random KPS. Assume that the nodes have been set-up with Eschenauer’s KPS [20] . An 
attacker can capture a node, compromise its keys and drive the following path-key 
attack: the attacker uses different replications of the captured node at multiple WAHN 
locations to establish path-keys. Since path-keys are to be taken from the key ring of the 
trusted node [20], in each new established path-key the attacker has a new chance to 
learn a new key included in the initial key pool S. 
Assume now that the nodes have been set-up with a random KPS supporting node 
authentication. In this case, it has been suggested by Newsome et al. [34] that a node 
replication attack can be "relatively simply" defended by centrally registering each 
identity's location. However, in WAHNs with multiple partitions the path-key attack 
will anyway succeed because no central entity can interconnect all the partitions. 
Partitions are likely to happen in mobile WAHNs and in low-cost low-power WAHNs 
(where a node can be in sleep mode up to a 99.90% of the time). In fully-connected 
WAHNs, the attacker can cause partitions and then mount the path-key attack. To cause 
WAHN partitions the attacker disrupts the link of some carefully selected nodes.  
2.5.6 Deterministic Key Pre-distribution Schemes 
The energy, connectivity and security drawbacks of using neighboring nodes as TTP are 
solved with deterministic KPSs that enable direct key sharing between any arbitrary 
pair of nodes. The system key and trivial key KPSs (discussed in Sections 2.5.3 and 
2.5.4) belong to this classification. 
Blundo’s two-party [19] polynomial-based KPS provides an interesting system for 
WAHN security. As the trivial KPS, Blundo’s KPS supports a distinct pairwise key 
between each and every pair of nodes of a WAHN. However, Blundo’s KPS trades-off 
resiliency for scalability. It can be applied to WAHN applications requiring a large 
number of scarce-memory nodes and relaxed resiliency.  
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A symmetric bivariate λ-degree polynomial over a finite field Fq is a polynomial of the 
form ∑= λ
=0,),( ji jiji yxayxf . Each of the coefficients ija  are randomly taken from a finite 
field with q elements, where jiij aa = . Note that ),(),( xyfyxf =  . The finite field order q 
is a prime number large enough to accommodate the size of a cryptographic key. That 
is, for a WAHN application requiring keys of 64 bits, q must be a prime number larger 
than 264. 
A polynomial share ),( yuf  is calculated by evaluating ),( yxf  at a point u of the finite 
field Fq. For 1≥λ , ),(),( yvfyuf ≠ , if vu ≠  and qFvu ∈,  [19]. 
In the set-up phase, a set-up server constructs a symmetric bivariate λ-degree 
polynomial ),( yxf . To each node u, the server pre-distributes a polynomial share ),( yuf . 
The share ),( yuf  is to be calculated by evaluating ),( yxf  at a point u of the finite field 
Fq. Hereafter the point u identifies (ID) the node carrying ),( yuf . 
Imagine now that nodes are deployed in a physical area. Consider two arbitrary nodes u 
and v willing to establish a secure link. Node u and v carry shares ),( yuf  and ),( yvf , 
respectively. To be able to establish a pairwise key, both nodes firstly need to exchange 
their own IDs, i.e. u and v.  Node u calculates a pairwise key kuv by evaluating ),( yuf  at 
point v, i.e. ),( vufKuv = . In parallel, node v calculates a pairwise key kvu by evaluating 
),( yvf  at point v, i.e. ),( uvfKvu = . Since ),(),( xyfyxf = , then both independently 
calculated keys kuv, kvu are equal, i.e vuuv KK = . 
Blundo's KPS enables node authentication. For 1≥λ , the generated key kuv is unique to 
the pair of nodes u and v. That is, no other node w can generate kuv from ),( ywf . 
The scalability of Blundo’s KPS is independent of the memory allocated for keying 
material. A polynomial share ),( yuf occupies 1+λ  times the length of a cryptographic 
pairwise key. The number of nodes that can be accommodated using this KPS is 1−q . 
Blundo’s KPS exhibits perfect resiliency up to 1+λ  captured nodes. That is, a coalition 
of no more than λ  nodes cannot generate pairwise keys of other non-colliding nodes. 
In most KPSs reviewed in the previous sections a node carries a set of ready-to-use 
cryptographic keys. In Blundo's KPS each node carries encoded keying information (the 
polynomial share) to be processed to generate the cryptographic key. In Chapter 4 we 
show how to minimize the energy cost of generating a Blundo key in low-power nodes. 
Key generation in Blundo’s KPS incurs no substantial communication overhead. Both 
nodes just exchange two IDs of a few bits without involving third-party communication 
overhead. We will see in Chapter 4 how to further decrease the communication 
overhead of Blundo's KPS. 
Blundo’s KPS possesses interesting connectivity properties for mobile sensor networks 
(MSNs) [2][3]. That is, any pair of sensors can generate a pairwise key independently of 
the physical connectivity properties of the WAHN. However, Blundo’s pairwise key 
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generation can be computationally expensive in sensor nodes with limited CPU 
capabilities because it requires λ modular multiplications and λ modular additions in Fq.  
Liu et al. [23] solve this problem for nodes with low-bit CPUs without division 
instruction. Each sensor carries t distinct polynomial shares, with coefficients over Fq’, 
qq <<' , 'log/log qqt = .  Each share is correspondingly calculated from a distinct 
symmetric bivariate polynomial. To generate a pairwise key a sensor concatenates the t 
partial keys of 'log q  bits generated from the t polynomial shares. 
The side-effect of this solution is that now the maximum number of nodes that can be 
accommodated is reduced to 1'−q . For instance, for optimal computational efficiency 
typical values of q’ are 12' 8 +=q  or 12' 16 +=q . In such cases, the scalability of the KPS 
is reduced to 256 or 65536 nodes. In Chapter 4 we show how to increase the scalability 
of the modified KPS. 
S. A. Çamtepe and B. Yener [28] applied combinatorial designs to key pre-distribution. 
They first propose a simple KPS based on Finite Projective Planes (FPP) (refer to 
Chapter 4 for a complete introduction to FPP theory). 
This KPS enables each and every pair of nodes of a 12 ++ nn -node WAHN to find one 
common key within their key rings. The same key is shared by 1+n  distinct nodes. 
Each node needs to store 1+n  distinct cryptographic keys. 
This KPS exhibits nice properties for WAHN security: direct key establishment, 
tolerance to node captures (up to n nodes under the smart attacker model) and no 
computational or communication overhead.  
However, given that n needs to be a prime power lower or equal to m (the memory 
restriction), it is not always possible to find a design with the desired network 
scalability. By introducing randomness in the design, their hybrid design-based KPS 
augments scalability of the initial scheme to the cost of sacrificing direct connectivity.  
Because a key is shared by  1+n  distinct nodes, the KPS does not support node 
authentication.  
To this classification belongs the DPKPS [2] presented later in Chapter 4 (see optionally 
[2]). The DPKPS exhibits nice properties for WAHN security, including direct key 
establishment, resiliency, computational and communication efficiency, network 
scalability and node authentication. 
2.6 Summary and Conclusions 
Among the existing key management options, we have identified that, to date, PKI and 
KPS constitute the most adequate alternatives to fundament security in WAHNs. 
To date there exist a great deal of proposals for setting up PKIs in WAHNs. A PKI 
enables data confidentiality and integrity, data and entity authentication and 
non-repudiation services. However, because of the limitations of WAHN nodes, PKI 
enabled key establishment does not offer optimal performance for WAHNs. 
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Consequently, in Chapter 3 we address the energy limitations of existing PKI enabled 
key establishment. 
In some WAHN applications, typically, in WSN applications, because of the scarce 
resources of the devices, PKI cannot be applied at all. We have evaluated KPS 
proposals enabling lightweight key establishment in WSNs. KPSs enable data 
confidentiality and integrity and they often enable also data and entity authentication. 
However, because of the restrictive demands of WSN applications, most KPSs do not 
exhibit adequate performance properties. Consequently, in Chapter 4 we additionally 
address the performance limitations of existing KPSs. 
Chapter 3: Hybrid Key Management Infrastructure 
41 
3 Hybrid Key Management Infrastructure 
PKI enables confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation services in a 
flexible and scalable manner [1][31][16]. In a security solution, the process of key 
establishment is paramount as it sets symmetric keys to further enable the services of 
data confidentiality, integrity and authentication. 
Public key based key establishment is a limitation in WAHNs composed of moderate 
resource nodes. Because public key operations are highly CPU intensive and because 
messages of public key based protocols are large, the communication can be 
substantially delayed and batteries rapidly exhausted. These limitations turn to be 
particularly critical in scenarios where nodes need to often establish new keys with a 
great number of other nodes. 
The HKMI [1] leverages existing PKI proposals [6]-[15] to construct a security solution 
offering the same security services as any PKI, i.e. confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication and non-repudiation. Therefore, HKMI can be applied to any WAHN 
application for which the underlying PKI has been conceived.  
Moreover, HKMI enables key establishment with substantially improved time and 
energy efficiency. Our results demonstrate that with single-CA-based HKMI two nodes 
can establish a key up to two orders of magnitude faster (see Figure 8) and investing up 
to three orders of magnitude less battery resource (see Figure 6) than with single-
CA-based PKI. Greater improvements are achieved when hierarchical CAs are 
involved. 
To design the HKMI for WAHNs, we exploit the demonstrated advantages of 
symmetric key cryptography (SKC) over public key cryptography (PKC). First, for 
comparable security level the size of a symmetric key is one order of magnitude shorter 
than public key. For instance, till 2010 to date recommended size for widespread used 
RSA public keys is 1024 bits while for symmetric keys is 80 bits [61]. The length of 
messages exchanged by protocols based on SKC or, alternatively, PKC is proportional 
to the length of the keys [31]. Radio transmission (i.e. bits transmitted on the air) 
consumes significant power on mobile nodes [68]. Consequently, SKC-based protocols 
are more communication-efficient than PKC-based protocols. 
Second, the operations of SKC algorithms (namely AES) are up to three orders of 
magnitude more computationally efficient than PKC operations (namely the popular 
RSA or ECC) [40][68]. Consequently, SKC-based protocols are more 
computationally-efficient than PKC-based protocols. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we set the scope, 
assumptions and objectives of this chapter. Section 3.2 provides an overall overview of 
HKMI and Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 and detail its components and mechanisms. The 
performance and the security level of the HKMI are assessed and compared with related 
work in Section 3.6. Finally, Section 3.7 summarizes and concludes this chapter. 
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3.1 Design Scope, Assumptions and Objectives 
The HKMI is targeted for WAHN applications requiring security services of 
authentication, communication confidentiality and integrity, and non-repudiation. It is 
of especial interest for low-bandwidth WAHNs of static or relatively mobile and 
moderate-power devices. 
We assume a wireless WAHN (see a simple example on Figure 1) composed of static or 
mobile nodes without online access to any fixed network infrastructure. Note that this 
assumption does not exclude nodes having access to a fixed network infrastructure 
sometime before joining or after quitting the WAHN. 
The WAHN is formed by suddenly interconnecting a few nodes without previous 
planning. New nodes may sporadically join or quit the WAHN. Any node within 
WAHN coverage area may join. The precise composition of a WAHN is not 
predictable. The lifetime of the WAHN is transient. Once connected to the WAHN, 
each node establishes communication links with other nodes. 
Typical WAHN devices, considered in this chapter, are PDAs, mobile phones, and 
embedded systems in portable devices. These devices have moderate computing power 
and storage resources as well as limited battery power life. We assume nodes possess 
similar resource capabilities. The nodes are capable of computing intensive public key 
operations to the cost of allowing sensitive communication delays and draining of 
batteries. For instance, an RSA signature takes 86 milliseconds on a 206-MHz PDA (see 
Table 2). 
Z
V
 
Figure 1. A WAHN formed of four PDAs 
We target civilian applications in which devices are carried/wore or placed around 
human users, i.e. nodes are not generally left unattended. Therefore, the risk of node 
compromise by an attacker is low. We also assume honest and cooperative nodes. 
An outside attacker may exploit the vulnerabilities of wireless transmissions to 
anonymously eavesdrop, modify, replay or inject bogus messages. 
For the descriptions in the rest of the chapter, we assume a WAHN with P nodes. We 
use u, b, w, v, y, x and z to refer to some generic nodes of the WAHN. 
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Figure 2. WAHN used to explain the HKMI 
Table 1 summarizes the notation used throughout this chapter. 
Table 1 Summary of notation in this chapter. 
b ,u, v, w, x, y, z Generic nodes of the WAHN 
IDX Unique identifier associated to a generic node x 
TP Trusted Portal node 
TP-X Generic node x serving as Trusted Portal 
DTPX Domain containing the trusted nodes of TP-X 
K Secret key 
K{m} Symmetric key encryption of message m with K 
SY,TPX   TP-shared-key: Long-term key shared by y and TP-X 
F() Collision-resistant one-way pseudorandom function 
KV,Z  Key shared by generic nodes v and z 
KTPXdel   Delegation Key: Key issued by TP-X (for delegation) 
3.2 HKMI Overview 
In this section we briefly overview the HKMI and compare with related work. 
3.2.1 Concept 
The HKMI is a security infrastructure providing efficient confidentiality, integrity, and 
authentication and non-repudiation services in WAHNs. 
Public key cryptography is required to provide secure non-repudiation services. Public 
key cryptography can also be used to, by means of a PKC-based key establishment 
protocol, derive symmetric keys for confidentiality, integrity, and authentication. 
HKMI relaxes time and energy overhead of PKC-based key establishment by providing 
instead an ad hoc symmetric key distribution architecture at the WAHN. 
The ad hoc symmetric key distribution architecture consists of two components: the 
Trusted Portals (TP) and the TP domains (see Section 3.4). A TP domain contains a set 
of nodes directly trusted by a TP. The TP generates and distributes symmetric keys to 
the nodes in its domain. A WAHN can contain one or more TPs. TPs also cooperate to 
distribute keys to nodes in different TP domains. 
The operations of the HKMI to enable the symmetric key distribution architecture can 
be divided in three fundamental phases: 
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1. Initialization of nodes with PKI (see Section 3.3), 
2. Trusted portal establishment (see Section 3.4), 
3. Nodes trust and key establishment (see Section 3.5). 
During phase (1.), WAHN nodes get a digital certificate from a WAHN PKI [6]-[15]. 
The digital certificate contains trust information and the public key of the owner node. 
In (2.), each node independently selects another member of the WAHN and then 
establishes a strong trust relationship. 
The selected member could be chosen by different strategies: randomly or 
deterministically. If we assumed that one or a set of powerful and secure nodes are 
always available at the WAHN, then these nodes can be deterministically selected by 
other less powerful nodes in joining the WAHN (this is a trivial case out of the scope of 
this thesis). 
We assume we ignore which specific nodes will be part of the WAHN before it is 
formed. We also assume nodes with similar resource capabilities. Thus, we adopt 
random selection of nodes. This option increases security strength and availability and 
distributes the computational charge evenly to a set of selected nodes. Optionally, a 
minimal trust level (TL) can be required on selected nodes. 
Finally in step (3.), in addressing other nodes of the WAHN, any node y uses its 
selected node x as an intermediary, e.g. y uses x to establish a key KYW with another 
node w or, even, to get trust information TLW related to w. Thus, hereafter we call nodes 
with same role as x Trusted Portals (TP). Intuitively, TPs constitute ad hoc established 
and distributed TTPs to securely access other nodes of the WAHN. 
3.2.2 Comparison with Related Work 
Our work completes previous WAHN PKI proposals [6]-[15] by adding an ad hoc 
symmetric key distribution architecture. It improves the time and energy performance of 
PKI-enabled key establishment protocols as demonstrated in Section 3.6. 
Moreover, our work compares advantageously with Pirzada and McDonald [5] 
proposal. They propose making use of a group of dedicated trusted servers, which reside 
at a network fixed infrastructure, to enable WAHN security. The trusted servers share a 
priori a pre-established secret with each end node and with each other server. 
Pirzada and McDonald approach exhibits critical vulnerabilities for WAHN security. 
Firstly, if any trusted server is compromised, the WAHN becomes insecure (i.e. the 
attacker reads the keys stored in the server and then use them to eavesdrop WAHN 
communications and/or to impersonate any WAHN nodes). Secondly, WAHN nodes 
use wireless communications to access the security server. Consequently, an attacker 
succeeds in disabling the establishment of new secure communications by simply 
jamming the wireless link to the server. Thirdly, if the WAHN looses connection to the 
server, no new security associations can succeed. 
In our work nodes of the WAHN constitute potential trusted servers, i.e. the TPs. TPs 
are established dynamically on demand. Therefore, the TP does not share any pre-
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established secret with each end node and with each other TP a priori. Instead, the 
secrets are established on demand, each time a new node sets trust with a TP. 
In HKMI a TP just stores keys of nodes in its TP domain. Therefore, by compromising 
a TP the attacker may just eavesdrop communications from or impersonate these nodes. 
HKMI relies on a PKI. Therefore, if a TP is unavailable (either as a result of an attack or 
a failure), its trusted nodes can still establish security associations with other nodes of 
the WAHN. Moreover, each of these nodes can establish a new own selected TP. 
3.3 Initialization of Nodes with PKI 
A PKI for WAHNs [6]- [15] underlies the HKMI. The PKI can operate either with an 
offline CA [6][7], with an online partially distributed CA [8]-[14] or with an online 
fully distributed CA [15] (see corresponding thorough reviews in Section 2.4). 
In HKMI with offline CA, each node x obtains its public/private key pair and public key 
certificate sometime before joining the WAHN [6][7]. In HKMI with online CA, nodes 
get their public key certificates and keys in joining the WAHN [8]- [15] (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Initialization of Nodes in WAHN PKI 
The certificate of node x digitally binds its identity IDX with the corresponding public 
key. The certificate can additionally include the level of trust TLX in the public key of 
node x. 
Furthermore, when operating with an online CA, other operations of the PKI such as 
certificate renewal and revocation can be enabled. 
The PKI is to be selected depending on the target application. A PKI operating with 
either an offline CA or an online partially distributed CA can be applied to WAHN 
applications where a single administration owns and controls the WAHN devices, e.g 
for medical WAHNs enabling patient care and monitoring. A PKI operating with an 
online fully distributed CA applies to WAHN applications with multiple independent 
administration entities, e.g. for automotive WAHNs enabling car-to-car communication. 
In the remainder of this chapter we assume any two nodes of the WAHN can validate 
the authenticity of each other's public key certificate. 
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3.4 Trusted Portal Establishment 
In joining the WAHN, each node v arbitrarily selects another node y from the ones 
present at the WAHN. Then, both nodes mutually authenticate by using their certified 
public/private key pairs. This mutual authentication establishes a bi-directional trust 
relationship between both nodes, which is required for the process of “Nodes Trust and 
Key Establishment” (see Section 3.5). 
Assume that, from a WAHN with nodes u, b, v, w, x and z, node y selects node x as its 
initial trusted node. In future communications, y will use x as a portal to address other 
nodes of the same WAHN securely and efficiently. Therefore, we call x a TP for y. In 
the following we use TP-X to denote “node x serving as TP”. 
A node y, whose current TP is TP-X, must establish a new TP, when node x quits the 
WAHN. 
In a simple HKMI all the WAHN nodes have the same level of trust associated to their 
public keys, i.e. trust or no trust. In this case, all the nodes possessing a valid certificate 
can serve as TPs to other nodes in the WAHN. 
In a more complex HKMI only nodes with special permissions are allowed to serve as 
TPs in the WAHN. For instance, using PGP’s terminology [17], node x can act as TP if 
and only if its public key is associated a complete trust level. The public key of one such 
a node is associated a complete trust level at "Initialization of Nodes with PKI ". 
3.4.1 Trusted Portal Domain 
Because each and every node of a WAHN must follow the “TP Establishment” process 
and TPs are randomly selected, more than one node may establish initial trust with the 
same node x. 
We define as TP-X domain the group of WAHN nodes associated to TP-X. From now 
on, we use DTPX to denote TP-X domain. For instance, in Figure 4, domain DTPX 
includes y and w (note that y and w are depicted as TP-Y and TP-W because they also 
have respective TP domains) as trusted nodes of TP-X. 
TP-X is the domain administrator of its own domain DTPX, i.e. TP-X decides when to 
accept a node in DTPX or when trust relationships with one or more trusted nodes of 
DTPX expire. 
To accept a node y in its domain, a TP must first authenticate the identity of y. As any 
other node in the WAHN, the TP also wants to save energy by using the HKMI. 
Accordingly, a TP rejects TP Establishment requests from new nodes if it already 
invested too much energy in establishing strong trust relationships (see analysis in 
section 3.6.3). 
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3.4.2  Generation of WAHN Trust Graph 
A consequence of the “TP Establishment” process is that one or more TPs are set in the 
WAHN. Because these TP nodes are selected randomly, a random trust graph 
connecting different nodes in the WAHN is generated. 
We can guarantee the continuous existence of a random trust graph without isolated 
cycles under the following two conditions: 
1. Each and every node of the WAHN must dynamically initialize trust with an 
own selected TP, i.e. a node repeats the “TP Establishment” process in joining 
the WAHN and when its TP disappears. 
2. A node, which is serving as TP in the moment it selects its own TP, must choose 
as TP a node not included in its TP domain or sub-domains (e.g. in Figure 4, 
TP-Y cannot select nodes v or z as TP).  If this condition cannot be satisfied for 
a node (e.g. x in Figure 4), then such node should not select any TP. 
For example, for a WAHN with nodes u, b, w, v, y, x and z, the “TP Establishment” 
process may happen as follows. Firstly, nodes v and z happen to establish trust with y, 
which then serves as TP-Y. Secondly, node y happens to establish trust with x, which 
then serves as TP-X. Thirdly, nodes u and b happen to establish trust with w, which then 
serves as TP-W. Fourthly, node w happens to also select x as TP. Finally, node x does 
not choose any other node. This instance has generated a random trust graph (see Figure 
4) where one or more intermediary TPs interconnect any pair of nodes. 
b
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Figure 4. An example of a random trust graph generated by “TP Establishment” (the straight lines 
connecting nodes denote strong trust relationships) 
The previous algorithm exhibits two potential limitations. First, it may generate a trust 
graph of excessive depth. Second, it generates a tree trust graph (similar to that depicted 
on Figure 4) in which a TP becomes the root (e.g. TP-X on Figure 4). Because the root 
is a key element of the graph, by disabling the root the attacker disrupts the HKMI. To 
solve these two limitations, some arbitrarily selected nodes can generate redundant 
paths and short-cuts in the graph. 
At the end of the “TP Establishment” process two arbitrary TPs are interconnected by 
either a direct trust relationship or by a set of indirect ones. Additionally, a trusted path 
of TPs interconnects two arbitrary nodes in different TP domains. 
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3.4.3 Trust Path Route 
A simple way to discover the shortest trust path of TPs connecting two end nodes is to 
let each TP node to internally store a dynamic trust routing table, TP-Route14, which 
indexes the IDs of target nodes and their respective TPs. The TP-Route table also 
enables a TP to know which nodes belong to its TP sub-domains, information of special 
relevance in the “TP Establishment” process. 
In the event of a WAHN membership change, which in turn implies that a node joins or 
quits a TP domain, all the TP-Route tables need to be updated. For that, a punctual 
notification, including the IDs of the joining/quitting node and of its TP, is triggered 
from the affected TP node to its parent TP and children TPs. This notification is to be 
forwarded in the same way to the rest of TPs. 
All these messages can be cryptographically protected to guarantee the confidentiality 
and integrity of the process as well as the anonymity of TPs to passive eavesdroppers. 
3.4.4 Trust Initialization Protocol 
In the moment of establishing a TP, a node y may also have its own TP domain TP-Y, 
i.e. some nodes v and z may have already established y as their TP. Thus, before issuing 
a TP service request to an arbitrarily selected node x, by consulting its TP-Route table y 
checks that x is not included in TP-Y domain or sub-domains. Then, assuming x is 
finally chosen, the following protocol enables y to establish x as its TP: 
Y→X: TP_Service_Request (1) 
TP-X↔Y: PKC challenge-response authentication (2) 
TP-X→Y: TP_Service_Accept, K{SY,TPX, T} (3) 
In message (1), y requests a TP service to node x. 
In (2), assuming that node x is cooperative, x and y mutually authenticate using certified 
public keys and agree in a session key K. 
In (3), TP-X sends to y a long-term shared symmetric key
 
SY,TPX encrypted and integrity-
protected with K and a timestamp T. Finally, y sets TP-X as its TP and, similarly, X sets 
Y as one of its trusted nodes. 
In the rest of the chapter, we will use the term TP-shared-key and the notation 
Snode,TPnode to refer to a long-term symmetric key shared between a node and its TP or to 
any of the keys ki derived from it, interchangeably. For instance, in the protocol above 
SY,TPX is a long-term symmetric key shared by y and TP-X. Note that this key enables y 
and TP-X to authenticate and protect future communications without the need to further 
run PKC-based authentication protocols. 
                                                 
14
 The TP-Route table does not typically match any table to discover network routes. Not to be confused. 
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3.5 Nodes Trust and Key Establishment 
TPs can be used as ad hoc distributed TTPs to distribute keys and related trust 
information within the WAHN. 
The first use case is when two arbitrary nodes v and z of the same TP domain want to 
establish a shared key KVZ. In such a case, their TP, e.g. TP-Y on Figure 4, acts as a TTP 
providing them of the shared key KVZ. Similarly, a common TP can vouch for nodes in 
its TP domain. For instance, TP-Y can associate v’s identity to the symmetric key KVZ 
distributed to z and z’s identity to the symmetric key KVZ distributed to v. 
In simple trust models KVZ, IDV and IDZ are sufficient to enable key establishment and 
mutual authentication of nodes v and z. In web-of-trust models, TP-Y additionally 
includes recommendation values, which enable both nodes v and z to respectively 
evaluate the level of trust that TP-Y has on their communication partner. 
The second use case is when two arbitrary nodes v and w of different TP domains want 
to establish a shared key KVW. The previous model with a single TP can be easily 
extended to several TP domains. In this case, various TPs need to cooperate to securely 
distribute shared keys and/or vouch for nodes in different TP domains. For instance, 
TP-Y delegates to its parent TP, i.e. TP-X, to vouch and distribute keys in DTPX related 
to TP-Y trusted nodes. 
The process of “Nodes Trust and Key Establishment” requires trust relationships 
established during “TP Establishment” to be bi-directional. First, z or v accept vouching 
and/or a key from TP-Y if and only if they trust TP-Y. Second, TP-Y only vouches for 
and distributes keys to its trusted nodes. 
3.5.1 Trust and Key Distribution Protocol 
In this section we describe the Trust and Key Distribution (TKD) protocol, a protocol to 
distribute trust and keys across TP domains. For simplicity’s sake we assume below a 
simple underlying PKI trust model. Assuming that v and w on Figure 5 want to establish 
a common key, the TKD works as follows (see also Figure 5): 
 
V→TP-Y: SV,TPY{KeyReq (IDW, IDV), T1} (1) 
TP-Y→TP-X: SY,TPX{KeyReq (IDW, IDV), (2) 
TP-X→W: SW,TPX{KV,W, IDV, T3}, ticketV (3) 
W→V: ticketV (4) 
In step (1), node v requests TP-Y a key for w. This message is encrypted under SV,TPY to 
guarantee the confidentiality of the process as well as the anonymity of TP-Y and of the 
involved nodes v and w against eavesdroppers. 
To protect against message replay and modification attacks, the messages must be 
additionally integrity protected, e.g. by including message authentication codes (MAC) 
as well as timestamps T1, T2 and T3. 
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In (2), TP-Y decrypts message (1) and obtains the included timestamp T1. TP-Y 
computes a Delegation Key KTPYdel by applying a pseudorandom function F(.) with 
SV,TPY and T1 as inputs, i.e. KTPYdel=F(SV,TPY, T1). 
With KTPYdel, TP-Y delegates to other TPs to vouch for v and distribute keys associated 
to v’s identity in their domains. Note that the Delegation Key also enables other TPs to 
communicate securely with v (see further steps below). 
TP-Y constructs message (2) by including KTPYdel and v’s key request. It then encrypts 
message (2) using the TP-shared-key with TP-X (the next TP in the trust path), i.e. 
 }T ,K ),ID ,(ID {KeyReqS 2TPYdelVWTPXY, . 
Finally, TP-Y sends to TP-X message (2). In this manner, v’s key request is forwarded to 
a TP in a different domain. 
In (3), decryption of message (2) with SY,TPX transmits to TP-X (w’s TP) TP-Y’s trust in 
IDV. TP-X randomly generates a new shared key KV,W for v and w. TP-X encrypts KV,W 
and IDV  using its TP-shared-key with w, i.e. SW,TPY{KV,W, IDV, T3}. TP-X also creates a 
ticket for v secured with KTPYdel containing KV,W and IDW, i.e. }T ,ID ,{KK  ticket 3WWV,TPYdelV = . 
TP-X sends to w message (3). 
In (4), node w forwards ticketV to v. Finally, w obtains KV,W by decrypting message (3) 
with SW,TPX. In parallel, v obtains KV,W by decrypting message (4) with KTPYdel. 
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Figure 5. Details of the TKD protocol 
In PKI web-of-trust models, the messages of the TKD protocol additionally include 
recommendation values voucherettR arg  on the identities of the participant TPs and end nodes. 
For instance, in the TKD protocol above, TP-Y includes in message (2) a 
recommendation value YVR on IDV for w, which is forwarded to w in message (3), 
together with a recommendation value XYR on IDY issued by TP-X. Observe that, on this 
basis, w can derive its own trust level TLV on v [62][17] (A detailed description of trust 
evaluation algorithms is out of scope of this thesis). 
Additionally, TP-Y includes in message (2) an encrypted recommendation value { }YXTPYV RS , on IDX for v, which can be forwarded to v in message (4) together with an 
encrypted recommendation { }XWTPYdel RK value on IDW issued by TP-X. Observe that, on 
this basis, v can derive its own trust level on w. 
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3.6 Analytical Performance Evaluation and Comparison to Previous 
Work 
In this section we analytically study the performance efficiency of the HKMI and 
demonstrate its improved performance for WAHN applications by comparing with PKI. 
We also discuss the security level of HKMI for different WAHN applications. 
We compare the cost of protocols to establish keys enabled by HKMI and PKI. Once a 
symmetric key is established, it can be used for node and/or data authentication and/or 
for data confidentiality and integrity protection. 
To avoid impersonation or man-in-the-middle attacks, two arbitrary nodes v and w, 
which want to establish a key KVW, need also to assess the authenticity of the node they 
are establishing the key with [31]. This can be achieved in PKIs by using an X.509 
strong two-way authentication protocol with key establishment (a similar protocol is 
included within the SSL/TLS protocol suite). In HKMI, given that nodes v and w trust 
their respective TPs, the TKD protocol can be used to establish the key KVW. 
For simplicity’s sake, in the following sections we assume that every WAHN node 
holds a public key certificate signed by a common CA and the corresponding CA 
public/private key pair. Because of this simplification, note that our results on 
computational and communication overhead are a best-case for X.509. That is, the 
overhead incurred by X.509 would be even worse if we considered a chain of 
certificates to be exchanged and validated till finding a certificate signed by a common 
CA. 
For evaluating HKMI, we further assume a WAHN with P nodes, from which N act as 
TPs. We use NAV to denote the average number of intermediary TPs in the shortest trust 
path between any pair of WAHN nodes. 
Because of the popularity, acceptance and wide-deployment of RSA and AES in current 
products we tested RSA and AES. To date most mobile devices are capable of working 
both in ad-hoc and infrastructure modes (such is the case of Bluetooth-enabled mobile 
phones and WiFi- and Bluetooth-enabled PDAs). RSA is employed in widely-deployed 
security suites such as SSL/TLS for infrastructure networks. Most devices to date 
include RSA public keys that can be used interchangeably for security in either of both 
modes. 
3.6.1 Communication Cost 
In this section we compare the communication cost of establishing a key with TKD 
against X.509.  
We count and compare bytes sent on the network by each protocol. We assume a single-
hop WAHN because it simplifies the analysis. Considering a multi-hop network 
complicates the derivation of formulae, which need to consider messages transversing 
multiple hops. Alternatively, an average of hops between two end nodes can be 
computed to derive simple formulae. However, since formulae need to finally be 
compared, the effect of multiple hops disappears. 
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Consider a small or medium sized WAHN where WAHN nodes are in direct wireless 
range of each other (this is the case of most ZigBee-enabled WAHNs). That is, two 
arbitrary WAHN nodes (this includes two contiguous TPs of the trusted path) are 
separated by a single-hop, i.e. a message sent from v to w travels the WAHN just once. 
We also consider typical sizes of RSA public keys and certificates as well as AES 
symmetric keys and encrypted messages [16]. However, the results in this section are 
implementation independent, i.e. we do not consider the message formatting imposed 
by different communication or security standards. Likewise, any overhead added by 
headers of the lower layers supporting the security messages is also ignored or by 
practical networking issues (such as retransmissions or message fragmentation). 
Note however that a practical implementation further increases the bandwidth usage of 
public key-based protocols. For instance, public key certificate of sizes typically 
exceeding the 256 bytes occupies at least three ZigBee network messages. In such a 
case, ZigBee adds from 17 up to 53 bytes per message. 
Let us compare the TKD and the X.509 protocols. During the X.509 protocol two 
arbitrary nodes v and w exchange two public key certificates, four timestamps, two node 
identifiers, two private key signed messages and two public key encrypted symmetric 
keys [31]. Then, 
( )RSAEncSignIDTCertBWCost iX +++×+×= 22509.  
During the TKD protocol, NAV+3 symmetric key encrypted messages are exchanged by 
nodes v and w and by the NAV intermediate TP nodes: 
TKDMessageNBWCost AVTKD ×+= )3(  
Let us use NBWEQ to denote the average number NAV of TPs for which 
TKDX BWCostBWCost =509. . Then, for BWEQAV NN < , HKMI-enabled trust and key 
establishment outperforms PKI. For instance, in a WAHN application using public key 
certificates of 256 bytes (just including a public key and a digital signature of 1024 
bits), timestamps of 8 bytes, symmetric keys of 128 bits and the cipher AES-128, NAV 
should be lower than. 32=BWEQN . Note that establishing a key with TKD can improve 
the communication overhead of X.509 up to three orders of magnitude (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6. Communication cost of key establishment 
The number NBWEQ can be used as an additional parameter to control the maximum 
number N of TPs in a WAHN with P nodes, such that BWEQAV NN ≤ . 
Let us derive the value N for a worst-case trust connectivity scenario. The worst-case 
scenario exhibits the longest possible average path length between any pair of nodes. 
This case leads to maximum communication cost because TKD packets transverse the 
maximum number of intermediary TPs. 
Doyle and Graver [67] proved that a simple path graph exhibits the longest possible 
average path length ( ) 31+= nLAV  of any graph with n vertices and n-1 edges. 
Therefore, in the worst-case scenario the N TPs are subsequently disposed on a simple 
trust path (see an instance on Figure 7). Furthermore, a packet between any pair of 
nodes transverses at most ( ) 31+= NN AV  TP nodes. Therefore, 13 −= AVNN  and, 
finally, 
13 −≤ BWEQNN  (worst-case) 
The formula above sets an upper bound in the number N of TPs that shall be part of the 
WAHN, for the worst-case scenario. In the worst-case, for 13 −< BWEQNN  the 
communication efficiency of the hybrid approach outperforms PKI. For instance, 
32,95 =< BWEQNN . Naturally, in other scenarios, where the N TPs are not disposed 
along a simple trust path, the maximum number N of TPs allowed is even greater. 
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Figure 7. Worst-case trust graph scenario 
3.6.2 Computational Cost 
In this section, we compare the TKD and X.509 protocols in terms of computational 
cost. 
The X.509 protocol requires two nodes v and w to compute four signature verifications, 
two signature generations, two public key encryptions and two private key decryptions 
[31]. Then: 
RSASigGenRSASigVerCCost X ×+×= 46509.  
The TKD protocol requires both nodes v and w and the NAV intermediate TP nodes 
altogether to compute NAV+2 symmetric key encryptions and NAV+2 symmetric key 
decryptions. Then: 
AESDecNAESEncNCCost AVAVTKD ×++×+= )2()2(  
We have developed a testing environment using Microsoft® CryptoAPI 1.0 [63] and 
Szymon Stefanek’s AES C++ Class [64] on an iPaq Pocket PC with ARM SA1110 
CPU at 206 MHz. Table 2 presents a summary of the cost (measured in milliseconds) to 
compute typical RSA public key and AES symmetric key operations. We consider RSA 
keys of 1024 bits and AES keys of 128 bits. 
Table 2. Computational effort (milliseconds) 
Operation Settings Timings (ms) 
RSA Signature 
Generation/Decryption 83 
RSA Signature 
Verification/Encryption 
Modulus 1024-bit; Public exponent 3 
3.90 
AES Encryption Plaintext Length 256 bits; Key Length 128 bits 0.0235 
AES Decryption Ciphertext Length 256 bits; Key Length 128 bits 0.0224 
Figure 8 depicts CCostX.509 and CCostTKD with values of Table 2, for different number 
NAV of TP nodes. Let us use NCEQ to denote the number of TPs for which 
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TKDX CCostCCost =509. . As Figure 8 shows the TKD protocol outperforms the X.509 for 
a number NAV of TP nodes lower than NCEQ = 7700 TPs. Note that establishing a key 
with TKD can improve the computational overhead of X.509 up to two orders of 
magnitude (see Figure 8). 
0
100
200
300
400
500
0
10
00
20
00
30
00
40
00
50
00
60
00
70
00
80
00
90
00
10
00
0
NAV
m
s
X.509 TKD
 
Figure 8. Computational cost of key establishment (measured in milliseconds) 
Recall that the worst-case scenario (see Figure 7) fixes 32≤AVN  for improved 
communication efficiency. In such case, the computational overhead of establishing a 
key is negligible. 
3.6.3 Analysis of a Mobile Scenario 
In this section, we analyze the overhead introduced by HKMI in mobile scenarios where 
the WAHN membership changes dynamically. 
The results in sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 are valid for static scenarios where each and 
every node only establishes one TP. Once a set of TPs is established in the WAHN, all 
the nodes can establish keys by using the TKD protocol.  
In mobile scenarios, it is likely that nodes sporadically join and quit the WAHN (see 
Figure 9). If a quitting node is a TP (e.g. y on Figure 4 and Figure 9), then the nodes of 
that TP-domain must re-establish an own TP. Additionally, in node joining/ quitting 
events TP-route messages are flooded in the WAHN. 
MANET
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Figure 9. WAHN mobile scenario 
To evaluate the performance of establishing a key with HKMI in dynamic WAHNs we 
have to consider the costs of the maintenance of the TP-Route table and of the “TP 
Establishment” process, in addition to the performance of the TKD protocol in Sections 
3.6.1 and 3.6.2. 
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Firstly, let us analyze the communication overhead BWCostTP-Route introduced by the 
TP-Route table update process. Each TP-Route notification message goes from the 
issuing TP to parent and children TPs. Likewise, the notification is forwarded to the rest 
of TPs in the WAHN. Then15: 
onNotificatiNBWCost RouteTP ×−=− )1(  
Let us now analyze the maximum number of TP nodes allowed in order to consider 
BWCostTP-Route to be significant in low-rate WAHNs. We consider BWCostTP-Route to be 
significant when it goes above 1% of the available WAHN bandwidth. 
Let us assume a WAHN membership change rate of one node each t seconds and 
consider a 70% network throughput [66] (i.e. 30 % lower layers overhead).  
Each TP-Route notification message is the concatenation of two node IDs encrypted 
under a symmetric key. For instance, in WAHN applications using node IDs of 8 bytes 
(which enables WAHNs of up to 264 nodes) and AES-128 bit encryption, the 
notification message takes just 16 bytes. Because of the lower layers overhead the 
message occupies 20.8 bytes. 
Bluetooth® offers a bit rate of 1 Mbps and a single-hop Bluetooth® WAHN contains at 
most 8 active nodes. Therefore, because BWCostTP-Route for N = 8 is extremely low (see 
Figure 10), TP-Route notifications incur no significant overhead on Bluetooth WAHNs 
(see Figure 10). 
In the 2.4 GHz band ZigBeeTM offers a bit rate of 250 kbps. The theoretical maximum 
number of devices of a ZigBee network using 64-bit addressing is 264. However, in 
practice a single-hop ZigBee network should be composed of just a few hundred nodes 
to avoid congestion, interferences or delays. For instance, imagine a network where 
each node needs to send a data packet of 250 bits each second. At 250 kbps each packet 
takes 1 millisecond. Assuming strictly fair and ordered medium access and ignoring 
other sources of overhead (such as medium access delay, processing delays, or network 
management traffic), the maximum number of devices in this scenario is just 1000 
nodes. If the data packet increases its size by one factor, then the maximum number of 
nodes is just 100. 
In a ZigBee WAHN, if the membership change rate is slower or equal than t = 10 
seconds, the maximum number N of TPs can be up to 300 (see Figure 10). A number of 
up to 300 TP nodes results high enough to serve a network bounded in practice to a few 
hundred nodes. 
                                                 
15
 Note that (although ignored in this analysis) in single-hop WAHN scenarios a much more efficient 
protocol could alternatively broadcast the TP-Route notification message without the need for N-1 
retransmissions, thus, substantially reducing communication overhead. 
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Figure 10. TP-Route update communication cost. The figure compares the available Bluetooth and 
ZigBee data rate against the required BWCostTP-Route 
The computational overhead added by the TP-Route update process can be neglected. 
Considering a WAHN with 95 TP nodes (recall that N = 95 for comparable key 
establishment communication overhead in the worst-case trust graph scenario of Figure 
7), then a TP-Route notification message is both encrypted and decrypted 95 times. 
Assume an average WAHN membership change rate of t = 10 seconds and AES 
encrypted/decrypted messages of 128 bits. Then, the computational cost results in 2.18 
milliseconds, shared by 95 TPs (2.18/95 seconds/TP) each 10 seconds. 
Now let us analyze the computational effort CCostTPEst-V of the “TP Establishment” 
process on a given node v for an interval of time TV. During TV, node v needs to 
establish trust every time its TP node quits and every time it accepts TP service requests 
from other nodes. Let us use Vq  to quantify the number of TPs of v that quit the WAHN 
and Vr  to quantify the number of TP service requests served by v during TV: Therefore, 
( ) 2TPEstVVVTPEst CCostrqCCost ×+=−  
where (since the “TP Establishment” process is mainly based on the X.509 protocol): 
509.XTPEst CCostCCost ≈  
Let us use Vs  to quantify the number of times that node v establishes keys with different 
nodes of the WAHN. Consider Vs'  as the number of times TP-V acts as intermediary TP 
in the TKD protocol (during TV). Theerfore, for the TKD protocol, the computational 
cost on node v can be calculated as: 
( ) ( )2' +×+=− AVTKDVVVTKD NCCostssCCost  
and, for the X.509 protocol: 
2509.509. XVX CCostsCCost ×=− , 
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Finally, the computational cost on v in HKMI and PKI solutions, respectively, is 
calculated as follows: 
VTKDVTPEstVHKMI CCostCCostCCost
−
−− +=  
VXVPKI CCostCCost −− = 509.  
Consequently, from these two last equations, if CEQVV Nss <<+ ' , HKMI is 
computationally “cheaper” on a node v than PKI for VVV srq ≤+ . Here we have to 
distinguish to cases: (1) v is a NTP node; (2) v is a TP node. 
In case (1), the above condition reduces to VV sq ≤ . Assume that every tq seconds a node 
quits the WAHN. Then, qV tTq /≈ nodes leave the WAHN during TV. Further assuming a 
uniform probability of node quitting, then ( ) qPN ×  TP nodes quit during TV. Similarly, 
the probability that a specific TP node (more concretely the one serving v) quits is 1/N. 
Then: 
( ) PtTq qVV 1/ ×=  
This equation shows that the period of time TV that a node v can expect to be connected 
to the WAHN without the need to re-establish a new TP is qtP × . For instance, consider 
a WAHN with 256 nodes and with a (high) membership change rate of t = 10 seconds16 
(i.e. 20=qt ). In such a case, 4.1≈VT  hours. 
Consequently, if during the whole period of time a NTP node v is connected to the 
WAHN, v establishes in average more than one new key using the TKD protocol each 
period TV, HKMI results more computationally efficient for v than using PKI. 
In case (2), the value of rV can be controlled by v. In each interval of TV seconds, v 
should not accept more TP service requests than the number of new keys to be 
established minus one, i.e. VV rs ≥−1 . Consequently, if during the whole period of time 
a TP node v is connected to the WAHN, v establishes in average more than 1+Vr  new 
keys using the TKD protocol each time period TV, HKMI results more computationally 
efficient for v than using PKI. 
A last rule can be derived from the previous analysis: nomadic nodes, which can be 
foreseen to have a short transitive connection to the WAHN, should not play the role of 
TPs. 
3.6.3.1 Assimilation of TP-domain 
To minimize the computational overhead caused by “TP Establishment” process when a 
TP quits the network, TP-domains can be assimilated. 
                                                 
16
 The average membership change rate t is influenced by nodes joining and quitting the WAHN. If nodes 
join and quit at the same average rate tj = tq, then t= tq/2. 
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Before a TP quits the WAHN, it transfers its trusted nodes to its parent TP. In this 
manner, nodes from the quitting TP become assimilated into the parent’s TP domain 
without having to re-establish trust with any TP. For instance, if TP-Y on Figure 4 quits, 
nodes v and z formerly included in DTPY, become assimilated by DTPX (see Figure 11). 
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Figure 11. Assimilation of a TP-domain 
Consequently, nodes only need to establish their own TP just in joining the network. 
Additionally, changes on WAHN membership do not increase the computational 
overhead of the HKMI significantly. 
3.6.4 Storage Cost 
Although we do not consider the storage requirements a relevant constrain in WAHNs 
of nodes with moderate resources, here we provide a brief analysis on the storage 
overhead of the HKMI. 
The main storage requirements of the HKMI (aside from the need to store public keys 
and certificates) arise from the need to store a TP-Route table and TP-shared-keys on 
TP nodes. 
Assuming a naïve implementation, the TP-Route table contains the IDs of the P nodes 
of the WAHN. The TP-shared-key can be computed using the method to compute 
long-term shared keys in Lotus Notes [16]. With this method the TP-shared-key SY,TPX  
issued by TP-X to any node y included in DTPX can be easily derived from a secret STPX 
(only known to TP-X) and the identifier IDY, without the need for TP-X to store SY,TPX, 
i.e. TP-X only needs to store its secret STPX.  
Therefore, the storage cost on TP-X is calculated as: 
)()( TPXX SSizeIDSizePSCost +×=  
In WAHN applications using node IDs of 8 bytes and secrets of 16 bytes, each TP needs 
to merely store 2 Kbytes of data in order to enable up to P = 256 nodes in the WAHN. 
3.6.5 Security Analysis 
WAHN applications can be divided in two big cases depending on the ownership of the 
nodes: 
1. Mobile nodes are owned by a single administrative entity (e.g. a hospital IT 
administration), 
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2. Mobile nodes are owned by different administrative entities (e.g. different 
human users). 
From the security perspective we have to further distinguish two types of case (1.). In 
applications of type 1.A the risk of node compromise is low or null (Recall we designed 
the HKMI particularly for applications of type 1A). Type 1.B models applications with 
moderate or high risk of node compromise. 
In applications of type 1.A, the major security risks are imposed by the open nature of 
wireless WAHNs. Here an outside attacker may try to anonymously eavesdrop, modify 
and replay WAHN wireless communications and/or even inject bogus messages. 
In this case, the HKMI exhibits perfect security. In effect, the messages exchanged by 
core HKIM protocols are always transmitted through channels protected with 
confidentiality and integrity mechanisms. 
In practice, employing an implementation with secure cryptographic algorithms and 
appropriate key lengths and lifetimes, no security sensitive information can be learnt 
eavesdropping wireless communications in offline or real-time attacks. Additionally, 
these messages cannot be replayed or modified and bogus messages cannot be injected 
in the wireless channel without going detected. 
In applications of type 1.B an attacker may additionally compromise nodes. This 
attacker can fake trusted identities or issue false keys and trust recommendations. 
Note that, in order to succeed in such an attack, first the attacker must capture a TP 
node. This task is particularly difficult because TPs remain anonymous to 
eavesdroppers. This feature "hides" the TPs to the attacker and, consequently, he/she 
needs to capture nodes randomly. 
In a network of P nodes with N TPs the probability of success in capturing a TP node is 
N/P. Imagine N/P = 0.1. In this example, the attacker needs to capture an average of 10 
nodes to succeed finding a TP among them. This lets the WAHN enough time to detect 
and react against the attack. In general, in applications of type 1.B, the ratio N/P should 
be high to minimize the risk of TP captures. 
In addition to the threats of applications of type 1.B, in applications of case 2 some 
nodes may misbehave by not cooperating. Moreover, a misbehaving user may try to 
fake information in its behalf or in behalf of its “mates”. These kind of attacks are 
common in other security solutions based on node trust and cooperation [62][15][17], 
and, particularly, also in the HKMI. 
In applications of case 2 the security robustness of the HKMI can be improved by 
adding one or a combination of the following countermeasures. The first 
countermeasure consists in coupling reputation mechanisms [65] with HKMI. As a 
misbehaving node is detected, it gets a "bad" reputation value. Nodes with bad 
reputation (too many associated "bad" reputation values) is not trusted anymore by the 
rest of nodes, despite it holds a public key certificate signed by a trusted CA. 
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Second, the average number of intermediate TP nodes can be minimized to reduce the 
risk that an attacker is among them. Similarly, the formation of isolated trust graph 
cycles (to the cost of decreased trust graph connectivity) can be allowed to reduce the 
effect of the attack to just a portion of the WAHN. 
Finally, nodes can establish multiple alternative TPs (to the cost of increased 
computational overhead). In this manner, there exist multiple trust routes connecting 
two end nodes. The probability of having a misbehaving TP between two end nodes 
decreases when multiple alternative routes exist. 
3.7 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have presented the HKMI for WAHN applications requiring efficient 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation services. It finds particular 
application at WAHNs of moderate-resource nodes carried/wore or placed around 
human users. 
We apply a cooperative approach to improve time and energy performance of key 
establishment protocols enabled by existing WAHN PKIs. The HKMI uses an 
underlying PKI to initially set-up trust relationships between nodes of the WAHN. In 
this manner, a random trust graph connecting all the nodes of the WAHN is generated. 
Nodes of the shortest trust path connecting two end nodes cooperate on demand to 
securely distribute trust information and symmetric keys to the end nodes. 
Our analysis demonstrates that HKMI operating with a single CA allows nodes to 
establish keys up to two orders of magnitude faster (see Figure 8) and investing up to 
three orders of magnitude less battery resource (see Figure 6) than with PKI with a 
single CA. 
Typically, in WAHNs nodes will not possess a certificate directly signed by a common 
CA but by a chain of multiple intermediate certificates leading to a common root CA. In 
such a scenario, the improvement of HKMI in respect to PKI increases further. To 
establish a symmetric key, in PKI two nodes need to exchange and validate multiple 
intermediate certificates to ultimately validate the certificate validating each other's 
public key. In HKMI intermediate TPs generate and distribute a symmetric key to both 
nodes without the need to exchange long public key-based messages or compute 
intensive PKC operations. 
HKMI enables time and energy efficient security in WAHNs independently of the 
WAHN membership. However, because the “TP Establishment” process is based on 
public key cryptography, the same concept cannot be applied to ad hoc networks of 
extremely resource-constrained nodes (e.g. for wireless sensor networks).  
Additionally, because trust and key distribution is based on cooperative trust, the HKMI 
does not result an optimal security solution for WAHNs of unattended nodes in public 
or hostile deployment areas. Finally, a cooperative key distribution approach may add 
significant energy and delay overhead in WAHNs of low-duty cycle and highly mobile 
nodes. 
All these problems are tackled and solved in Chapter 4. 
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4 Deterministic Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution 
Key pre-distribution is to date the best alternative to provide security for WAHNs of 
extremely resource-constrained nodes [30][2][3]. 
In this chapter, we present our DPKPS [2] for WAHN security. In short, the DPKPS is a 
system to pre-distribute keying material to WAHN nodes. It enables any pair of nodes 
to directly establish a pairwise symmetric key in an efficient manner. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1 we set the scope, assumptions and 
objectives for the design of the DPKPS. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 introduce important 
theoretical background to understand the development of the DPKPS in Section 4.4. In 
subsection 4.4.5 we further describe how nodes shall be identified to substantially 
improve the communication efficiency of the original DPKPS. The exhaustive and 
thorough theoretical and practical analysis of the DPKPS is presented in Sections 4.5 
and 4.6, respectively. Sections 4.7 and 4.8 compare the DPKPS with related work. 
Section 4.9 summarizes and concludes this chapter. 
4.1 Design Scope, Assumptions and Objectives 
The DPKPS is targeted for WAHN applications requiring extremely low-power security 
services of authentication, communication confidentiality and integrity. It is of especial 
interest for (but not limited to) mobile sensor network (MSN) applications. 
Nodes are low-cost battery-powered devices with limited computational and storage 
capabilities. Representative devices include the AquisGrain wireless nodes (see Figure 
16) developed by Philips [54][55] and the MICA Mote family of wireless motes 
developed by Crossbow. 
An AquisGrain (and MICAz) is provided with an ATmega128L low-power 8-bit micro-
controller and a 16-bit wide bus. It can be configured to work at a clock frequency of up 
to 8MHz. Because of these features intensive security operations in AquisGrain can take 
up to several seconds. 
Aquisgrain (and MICAz) also includes a 128 Kbytes of flash memory, a 4 Kbytes 
EEPROM and a 4 Kbytes of SRAM. The EEPROM functions as a computer BIOS, 
which stores critical data to enable self-booting. The flash is mainly reserved to save 
application software. In sensor network applications, these nodes have intermittent 
connectivity to the WAHN. Consequently, a big portion of the flash memory must also 
be reserved to store transiently gathered sensor data. The SRAM offers just 4 Kbytes to 
store dynamic variables handled by running processes. Because of these memory 
limitations an AquisGrain cannot compute operations with big numbers as required for 
public key cryptography. Moreover, the footprint of security modules cannot be of an 
excessive size. 
Aquisgrain is sourced to a tiny cell battery of 3 volt of limited energy capacity. In 
typical sensor network applications, it is required that nodes can operate weeks, months 
and even years without manual intervention. Therefore, usage of power-intensive 
operations is prohibitive. 
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To reduce manufacturing and WAHN-overall costs, these nodes are typically produced 
without tamper-protection modules. 
In the applications considered in this chapter nodes are deployed and left independent in 
a given physical area. Because of different reasons (e.g. the human owner cannot or has 
difficult access to that area; the owner needs a fast deployment, and so forth) nodes are 
typically randomly deployed. After the deployment phase, i.e. when the nodes occupy a 
position in the final deployment area, nodes within wireless range –neighbors– form 
links autonomously and, ultimately, a WAHN. Because nodes operate at low-duty 
cycle, nodes rely on intermittent short-range wireless communication to sporadically 
connect to the WAHN [40]. 
After the initial deployment, new nodes may be added to the WAHN sometime later. 
Naturally, these nodes need to be interoperable with the old nodes existing at the 
WAHN. 
In typical WAHN applications, nodes are attached to mobile objects (e.g. to a human 
body or to an animal). In this case, the process of node deployment and WAHN 
formation is dynamic. Thus, predicting which nodes will come into proximity and 
establish wireless links becomes even more difficult than in the previous model. In such 
applications, the best approach is assuming that any node may come into proximity and 
establish wireless links with any other node. Because of the singularity of this case, it is 
also possible that WAHNs coexist sparsed in the same deployment area. Mobile nodes 
randomly move and eventually connect to any of these WAHNs [2][3]. 
The WAHN can be formed of a huge number N of nodes. That is, up to hundreds of 
thousands of nodes. Because of intermittent wireless connectivity, multiple WAHN 
partitions can occur. In mobile scenarios, the N nodes disperse and form multiple non-
interconnected not necessarily equally-sized WAHNs. 
Typically nodes are deployed in public or hostile places and left unattended [29][40], 
where the risk of node captures becomes evident. 
Our design aims at maximizing the scalability, connectivity and security properties of a 
key pre-distribution system while adapting to resource and energy limitations of nodes. 
The DPKPS must exhibit perfect connectivity property (i.e. probability one that two 
arbitrary nodes can establish a key) of the DPKPS independently of the WAHN 
membership, size, topology, physical connectivity and node density. Consequently, it 
can be equally applied to small/medium/large partitioned/unpartitioned WAHNs of 
static/mobile nodes. 
4.2 λ-degree Symmetric Bivariate t-Polynomial Set 
In the rest of the chapter, let us assume that the WAHN application requires keys of 
 qlog  bits (e.g. 64 or 128 bits). We define     'log/log qqt = , 1≥t , and 1'' −= qN . 
Typically 1' −<< qN . 
A symmetric bivariate λ-degree polynomial over a finite field Fq’ (where q’ is a prime) 
is a polynomial of the form ∑= λ
=0,),( ji jiji yxayxf , where each of the coefficients ija  are 
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randomly taken from a finite field with q’ elements and jiij aa =  (Note that 
),(),( xyfyxf = ). 
After Blundo et al [19], a polynomial share ),( ypf u is defined as the evaluation of 
),( yxf  in a value pu of Fq’. Polynomial evaluation involves modular addition and 
multiplication operations in Fq’. A partial pairwise key of  'log q  bits 
),(),(' vuuvuv ppfppfK == results from the evaluation of ),( ypf u  at point pv, or, 
symmetrically, from the evaluation of ),( ypf v  at point pu. 
The resiliency α of the polynomial is 1+= λα , i.e. α distinct polynomial shares need to 
be pulled together to generate the original polynomial [19]. A polynomial can be used to 
generate up to 1'' −= qN  distinct polynomial share17s. Each polynomial share can be used 
to generate 'N  pairwise keys [19]. The length of a polynomial share ),( ypf u is 
( ) 'log1 q+λ  bits. 
Let us define a joint set of t λ-degree bivariate polynomials tii yxf ,...1)},({ =  with 
coefficients on Fq’ as a t-polynomial-set ),( yxFi . The t-polynomial-set ),( ypF ui evaluated 
at point pu hereafter is a t-polynomial-set share. 
After Liu and Ning[23], a pairwise key uvK of target length  qlog  bits (e.g. of 64 or 128 
bits) can be compounded by concatenating the t partial keys { }
tiiuvK ...1, =  generated with t 
polynomial shares tii yuf ,...1)},({ =
 
with coefficients on Fq’ ( qq <<' , where q’ is a prime of 
the form 12' += kq ) without a significant loss of security. That is, the resulting  qlog -bit 
key possesses similar entropy as it had been generated with a λ-degree bivariate 
polynomial with coefficients on Fq (with q prime). 
Therefore, a t-polynomial-set ),( yxFi  can be used to generate 'N  distinct 
t-polynomial-set shares and each t-polynomial-set share can be used to generate 'N  
pairwise keys. A t-polynomial-set is λ-collusion resistant. The length of a 
t-polynomial-set share ),( yuFi  is ( ) qlog1+λ  bits. 
The generation of keys using t-polynomial-sets can be applied to any polynomial-based 
KPS under certain lower bound on λ imposed by q, q’ and the total number of 
polynomials over Fq’ used by the KPS. We will extend on this last issue in section 4.5.6. 
The value q’ can be chosen to optimize computational efficiency in nodes (see section 
4.6.5.5). 
4.3 Finite Projective Planes 
A Balanced Incomplete Block Design (BIBD) [48][49][50] is an arrangement of v 
distinct elements into w blocks such that each block contains exactly k distinct elements, 
each element occurs in exactly r different blocks, and every pair of distinct elements 
                                                 
17
 Although Fq’ contains q’ elements, the value q’ cannot be used for evaluating a polynomial because it 
represents the value 'mod0 q , i.e. kyqf =),'(  is a constant that cannot be used to generate pairwise keys. 
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occurs together in exactly x blocks. The design can be expressed as ( )xkv ,, , or 
equivalently ( )xkrwv ,,,, , where: ( ) ( )11 −=− krvx  and vrwk = . 
In a symmetric BIBD (SBIBD) vw =  and, thus, rk = . A SBIBD has four interesting 
properties: every block contains rk =  elements, every element occurs in rk =  blocks, 
every pair of elements occurs in x blocks and every pair of blocks intersects in x 
elements. 
Finite Projective Planes (FPP) is a subset of SBIBDs of special interest for key pre-
distribution. An FPP is an SPIBD with parameters ( )1,1,12 +++ nnn  [50][49]. An FPP 
exists for any prime power n, where n≥2. FPP of order n has four properties: (i) every 
block contains exactly n+1 elements, (ii) every element occurs on exactly n+1 blocks, 
(iii) there are exactly n2+n+1 elements, and (iv) there are exactly n2+n+1 blocks. 
In the following, let iB  denote block number i of FPP- ( )1,1,12 +++ nnn . Let also 
{ }1,2,1, ,..., +niii bbb  be the elements of iB . Note that each element jib , , 1...1 += nj , occurs in n 
additional blocks of the FPP. 
Example 1: The seven blocks of an FPP- ( )1,3,7  constructed with the integers from 1 to 7: 
{ } { } { } { } { } { } { }713,672,561,457,346,235,124  
4.4 Deterministic Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Concept 
The  DPKPS pre-distributes 1+n  distinct t-polynomial-set shares ),(
,
ypF jujib , 
1...1 += nj , to each node u. The indices jib ,  of ),(
,
ypF jujib , for 1...1 += nj , are associated 
to the element jib , of a block iB  of an FPP- ( )1,1,12 +++ nnn . 
This distribution guarantees that any two nodes u and v carry distinct t-polynomial-set 
shares ),( ypF uk  and ),( ypF vk , respectively, of (at least) one common t-polynomial-set 
),( yxFk and, thus, can establish a pairwise key uvK . 
The DPKPS consists of four stages: 
1. Set-Up. A number of t-polynomial-sets are generated and evaluated for 
accommodating up to N nodes, 
2. t-Polynomial-Set Shares Pre-distribution. A number of t-polynomial-set shares 
are pre-distributed to each node, 
3. t-Polynomial-Set Shares Discovery. Two nodes find that they carry shares of the 
same t-polynomial-set, 
4. Pairwise Key Establishment. Two nodes establish a pairwise key. 
4.4.1 Set-up 
A set-up server randomly generates a set ℑ of ( )12 ++× nnt  λ-degree bivariate 
polynomials tr
nnb
r
b yxf ...1 12...1)},({ = ++=  over Fq’. Subsequently, for 1...1 2 ++= nnb , the set-up 
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server sequentially picks t polynomials from ℑ, and forms 12 ++ nn  t-polynomials-sets 
),( yxFb . 
Then, the set-up server generates an FPP- ( )1,1,12 +++ nnn , with elements belonging the 
set S of integers from 1 to 12 ++ nn . The set S is associated with a t-polynomial-set pool, 
i.e. each element b, 1...1 2 ++= nnb , in S is associated with a distinct t-polynomial-set 
),( yxFb . 
Further, each block iB  of FPP is associated with ( )1/' +nN  rings of distinct 
t-polynomial-set shares. The properties of FPPs guarantee that any pair of rings has at 
least one t-polynomial-set ),( yxFk  in common. 
Example 2: Seven t-polynomial-sets can be arranged in blocks of an FPP- ( )1,3,7  as follows: 
{ } { } { } { } { } { } { }731762651754643532421 ,,,,,, FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF  
4.4.2 t-Polynomial-Set Shares Pre-Distribution 
Each node u of an N-node population receives from the set-up server a distinct ring, 
which includes 1+n  t-polynomial-set shares ),(
,
,
ypF jujib , where ∈jup , Fq’, ∈∈ iji Bb , FPP, 
and 1...1 += nj . 
To guarantee uniqueness of pairwise keys, two different nodes u
 
and v cannot receive 
the same t-polynomial-set ),( yxFk  evaluated in the same point pk. Since each 
t-polynomial-set ),( yxFb , 1...1 2 ++= nnb , can be evaluated in 1'' −= qN  different points 
and the index b of ),( yxFb  appears in 1+n  FPP blocks, then each of these blocks (where 
b occurs) shall be used to pre-distribute distinct shares of ),( yxFb  to no more 
than ( )1/' +nN  different nodes. 
Here we detail a key pre-distribution process to accommodate up to ( ) ( )1/1' 2 +++ nnnN  
nodes18: 
1. Starting with the first block B1 of FPP with elements { }1,11,1 ,... +nbb , the first node 
(u1) receives t-polynomials-set shares ),( 11,1 ypFb to ),( 11,1 ypF nb + evaluated at point p1 
of Fq’; the second node (u2) receives ),( 21,1 ypFb to ),( 21,1 ypF nb + evaluated at point p2; 
and, so forth; till the ( )1/' +nN -th
 
node (uN’/(n+1)) receives ),( )1/('1,1 ypF nNb + to 
),( )1/('1,1 ypF nNnb ++  evaluated at point pN’/(n+1), 
2. Following with the second block B2 of FPP with elements { }1,21,2 ,... +nbb , assume 
1,21,1 bb = , node u1+N’/(n+1) receives ),( )1/('11,1 ypF nNb ++ , which is evaluated at point 
                                                 
18
 A variation of this process can be used to accommodate ( ) ( )1/1' 2 +++≤ nnnNN nodes, if desired. 
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p1+N’/(n+1) (because ),(1,1 yxFb  is already evaluated in lower points for nodes u1… 
uN’/(n+1)), and ),( 12,2 ypFb  to ),( 11,2 ypF nb +  evaluated at point p1; and so forth. 
This process is repeated to accommodate up to N nodes using all the blocks of the FPP. 
Example 3. Let us use the finite field F257 with elements 257,...2,1  ( 256' =N ) and the FPP- ( )1,3,7  
of examples above. In this case, the t-polynomial-set share pre-distribution phase goes as follows 
(see Figure 12): starting with { }1241 =B , the set-up server distributes to node 1 (u1) 
),1(1 yF , ),1(2 yF  and ),1(4 yF ; node 2 (u2), receives ),2(1 yF , ),2(2 yF  and ),2(4 yF ; and, so 
forth, till node 85 (uN’/(n+1)) receives ),85(1 yF , ),85(2 yF  and ),85(4 yF . 
Following with { }2352 =B , node 86 receives ),86(2 yF , ),1(3 yF  and ),1(5 yF ; node 87 receives 
),87(2 yF , ),2(3 yF  and ),2(5 yF and so forth. 
S1
F1(1,y)
F2(1,y)
F4(1,y)
S2
F1(2,y)
F2(2,y)
F4(2,y)
S85
F1(85,y)
F2(85,y)
F4(85,y)
S86
F2(86,y)
F3(1,y)
F5(1,y)
S87
F2(87,y)
F3(2,y)
F5(2,y)
S170
F2(170,y)
F3(85,y)
F5(85,y)
…
FPP blocks t-polynomial-set share pre-distribution
1
2
4
2
3
5
…
…
…
 
Figure 12. Example of t-polynomial-set pre-distribution 
A simple way to identify a node u in the DPKPS is to concatenate the n+1 indices 
1,1, ,... +nii bb of the n+1 t-polynomial-set shares it carries with the n+1 points 11 ... +nuu pp  
where they are evaluated. Such an ID uniquely identifies a node u and enables simple 
discovery of common t-polynomial-set shares.  
Because a simple ID requires excessive storage space and incurs excessive 
communication overhead (see Sections 4.5.3 and 4.5.4), we discuss an improved 
version of node IDs in section 4.4.5. 
4.4.3 t-Polynomial-Set Shares Discovery 
After node deployment, before establishing a pairwise key, each node u must discover 
which t-polynomial-set it shares with its communication neighbor v. 
Nodes u and v exchange their IDs, which implicitly contain the indices of the n+1 
t-polynomial-set shares they carry and the points 1,1, ... +nuu pp , 1,1, ... +nvv pp  where their 
respective n+1 t-polynomial-set shares are evaluated. 
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Finally, they find an index k (corresponding to the common t-polynomial-set ),( yxFk ) 
and the respective evaluation points pu and pv. 
Because of the properties of FPPs, two nodes u and v with respective 1+n  
t-polynomial-set shares distributed according to the elements of different blocks 
∈ji BB , FPP, ji ≠ , carry shares of one t-polynomial-set ),( yxFk  (See Case A on Figure 
13). 
Similarly, two nodes with respective 1+n  t-polynomial-set shares distributed according 
to the elements of the same block ∈iB FPP carry shares of 1+n common 
t-polynomial-sets (See Case B on Figure 13). This second kind of nodes can use any (or 
a combination) of the 1+n  t-polynomial-set shares to compute a unique pairwise key of 
 qlog  bits. 
S86
F2(86,y)
F3(1,y)
F5(1,y)
S2
F1(2,y)
F2(2,y)
F4(2,y)
S1
F1(1,y)
F2(1,y)
F4(1,y)
S2
F1(2,y)
F2(2,y)
F4(2,y)
Case A: One common share Case B: n+1 common shares
 
Figure 13. t-polynomial-set share discovery cases 
4.4.4 Pairwise Key Establishment 
To calculate a pairwise key Kuv, node u firstly evaluates the t λ-degree bivariate 
polynomials ),( ypf urk  (included in ),( ypF uk ), for tr ...1= , at point pv (i.e. ),( vurj ppf ) to 
obtain t partial keys. 
Finally, node u truncates the t partial keys to  'log q  bits and concatenates the t key 
segments to form a final pairwise key Kuv of  qlog  bits. 
Example 4: Following with Example 3., to establish a pairwise key 87,1k , nodes 1 and 87 evaluate 
),1(2 yF and ),87(2 yF at points 87 and 1, respectively. 
4.4.5 Optimized Node Identifier 
Because using simple node IDs considerably augments the storage and communication 
costs of the DPKPS (see Sections 4.5.3 and 4.5.4), in this section we present an 
alternative method. 
The method to construct optimized node ID exploits properties of FPPs based on 
mutually orthogonal latin squares (MOLS) [48][49][53]. 
The DPKPS FPP- ( )1,1,12 +++ nnn  is to be developed from a set of n-1 MOLS of order n. 
A node u is to be identified concatenating three numbers i, ip, and m
e
l , where 
11 2 ++≤≤ nni , ( )1/'1 +≤≤ nNip  and nem ≤≤1 . The first number, i, identifies a 
block ∈iB FPP according to which the t-polynomial-set shares of u are chosen. The 
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second number, ip, identifies the turn ip in the distribution of t-polynomial-set shares to 
u within Bi. The third number, m
e
l , identifies an element of the Latin square Li from 
which Bi is derived. 
The rest of stages are to be implemented as previously explained in sections 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 
4.4.3 and 4.4.4. 
The following subsections show that using such an FPP enables the optimized node IDs 
for the DPKPS without any loss of functionality. That is, the new ID also enables the 
discovery of t-polynomial-set shares and its points of evaluation. 
In the performance analysis (Sections 4.5 and 4.6), we demonstrate the improved 
performance efficiency of the DPKPS processes enabled by the optimized node ID. 
4.4.5.1 MOLS 
A Latin square19 is an nn ×  square matrix L whose entries consist of n elements such 
that each element appears exactly once in each row and each column [53]. 
We will use as elements of L the integers from 1 to n. A simple way to construct L is by 
placing the integers 1,2,...n in their natural order in the first row and, for consecutive 
rows, by cyclically rotating the previous row to the left. For instance, for 3=n : 








=
213
132
321
L  
Two Latin Squares 11 ijlL =  and 22 ijlL =  on n elements 1,2,...n are orthogonal if, when 
superimposed,  each of the n2 ordered pair of elements  ( )21 , ijij ll , ni ...2,1= ; nj ...2,1= , 
occurs exactly once. 
A set of Latin squares 1L , 2L ,… tL of the same order n, each of which is an orthogonal 
mate of each of the others, is called a set of MOLS. A set of n-1 MOLS of order n is a 
complete set  [53]. 








=








=
132
213
321
;
213
132
321
21 LL  
For n a prime power the set of polynomials of the form ( ) yaxyxfa +=, , nFa ∈≠ 0  
represent a complete set of n-1 MOLS of order n [53].  This leads to a simple 
construction method: let e1, e2, ...en be the elements of Fn, i.e. the integers 1…n. Then, 
for each element em, nm ,...2,1= , the elements meijl of the matrix meijme lL =  are sequentially 
calculated by the following equation: 
                                                 
19
 Also used to derive the popular Sudoku puzzles. 
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( ) jimmeij eeel +×=     (Eq-1) 
Observe that the parameters n and em are sufficient to reconstruct a specific orthogonal 
Latin square meijme lL = . This is a property that we apply for the discovery of common 
t-polynomial-set shares (see Section 4.4.5.3). 
4.4.5.2 Construction of an FPP from MOLS 
Let 1L , 2L ,… 1−nL be a complete set of MOLS of order n and M an nn × matrix. Firstly, 
matrix M is to be constructed by placing the n2 integers 1… n2 in their natural order 
from the first to the n-th rows. For instance, for n = 3: 








=
987
654
321
M  
Secondly, generate an Affine Plane AG ( )n,2 of order n from the MOLS as follows [53]: 
(i) the first n blocks are the rows of M, (ii) the second n blocks are the columns of M, 
and (iii) the remaining n2-n blocks are formed by sequentially superimposing each 
m
e
L on M, and taking as blocks the elements of M which correspond to a single element 
mel in each m
e
L . Since each m
e
L  contains n different elements, each ML m
e
:  
superposition yields n blocks. 
Finally, to obtain an FPP- ( )1,1,12 +++ nnn , (i) add a new integer 12 +n  to the first n 
blocks of the Affine Plane, (ii) add a new integer 22 +n to the second n blocks, (iii) add 
an integer men ++ 22  to the n blocks constructed from each m
e
L , and (iv) add a new 
block to the design, which contains the n+1 new added integers. 
Note that, given n and an FPP block index i, it is simple to reconstruct the elements of 
block ∈iB FPP, ni 21 ≤< . For instance, for n=3, block 4B  is constructed from the first 
column of M 33× and the integer 11, i.e. ( )11,7,4,14 =B . 
For a block ∈iB FPP, nnin +≤< 22 , index i also implicitly identifies the index em, 
11 −≤≤ nem , of the Latin square m
e
L , from which Bi is generated. For instance, for n=3, 
block 12B is generated from L2. 
To reconstruct one of these blocks Bi, nnin +≤< 22 , the element m
e
l is additionally 
required. 
4.4.5.3 Discovery of Common t-Polynomial-Set Share 
In this section, we describe how a node u can calculate the indices of its own 
t-polynomial-set shares and those of a partner node v. By comparing this information, 
node u can derive the index k, 11 2 ++≤≤ nnk , of the common t-polynomial-set share 
),( ypF uk  with node v. 
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Recall that the indices of the t-polynomial-set shares ),(
,
ypF jujib , 1...1 += nj , which a 
node u carries, are a one-to-one mapping to the elements { }1,2,1, ,..., +niii bbb  of a ∈iB FPP. 
As we advanced in the previous section given n, the index i of iB  and an integer mel , it 
is possible to uniquely reconstruct { } iniii Bbbb =+1,2,1, ,..., . Here we have to distinguish two 
cases: 
1. blocks iB , ni 21 ≤≤ , and 12 ++nnB , whose reconstruction is trivial; 
2. blocks iB , nnin +≤< 22 , whose reconstruction is also simple but requires the 
further analysis. 
In the second case, we know by step (iii) of the construction of Affine Planes that the 
elements { }1,2,1, ,..., +niii bbb  of iB are taken from the positions at M marked by 2n 
coordinates ( ) ( ) ( ){ }nn jijiji ,,...,,, 2211  where mel occurs within meL . Thus, determining these 
coordinates, a node gets the elements of iB . 
First, from the index i it is straightforward to derive em, which identifies the Latin 
square meL used to pick n of the elements of iB . Second, recall that in a Latin square 
each element appears exactly once in each row and each column. Then, mel occurs only 
once in each row of meL , i.e. mel  occurs at the positions ( ) ( ) ( ){ }njnjj ,,...,2,,1 21 . Since 
mel and em are known, using equation Eq-1, we have: 
( ) 1,1 11 =+×= ijmme eeel  
( ) 2,2 22 =+×= ijmme eeel  
… 
( ) neenel
ninjm
me
=+×= ,  
Observe that m
e
nj le =  because ( ) 0=× nem  in Fn. This allows us to re-write the previous 
system of equations as follows: 
mkjkj eee +=−1 , 2,...,1, −= nnk  and n
m
e
nj Fle ∈=  (see note20) 
Because neee mkjkj 21 ≤+=− , where nkj Fe ∈ , the value 1−kje  in Fn is calculated without 
the need of any division operation as follows: 
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e
≤ .  
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
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1  
Now sequentially order the n distinct values nkj Fe ∈ , nk ...1= , in a vector V of n 
positions ( )
njjj eee ,, 21 . 
Recall (from section 4.4.5.1) that the elements e1, e2, ...en from Fn are sequentially used 
to calculate each element meijl of the matrix meijme lL = , i.e. element e1 is used to calculate 
the elements at the positions ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1,,...1,2,1,1 n , element e2 is used to calculate the elements 
at the positions ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }2,,...2,3,2,2,2,1 n and so forth. Consequently, each value 
( ) nnjjj Feee ∈,, 21  determines the coordinates ( ) ( ) ( ){ }njnjj ,,...,2,,1 21 where mel  occurs within 
m
e
L , e.g. if for 33 =i , 23 =je , then 23 =j  ( mel occurs at ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }njnjj ,...2,3,,2,,1 21 ). 
Finally, mapping these coordinates to elements of matrix M, it is now straightforward to 
determine n out of n +1 the elements of iB . Now, we have a block of the Affine Plane. 
Adding the integer men ++ 22  to the block, we get the block { } iniii Bbbb =+1,2,1, ,..., . 
4.4.5.4 Derivation of t-Polynomial-Set Share Evaluation Point 
Assume a share of t-polynomial-set ),( yxFk  has been distributed to v, i.e. ),( ypF vk . To 
derive the point pv, where node u must evaluate its share ),( ypF uk to generate a key Kuv, 
node u must follow a simple process enabled by the properties of the FPP. 
From v’s ID, node u knows the index k of the common t-polynomial-set, a block index i 
and the distribution order ip, and the order n of the FPP. Recall ip is the order of a node v 
in the distribution of t-polynomial-set shares according to block ∈iB FPP, 
11 2 ++≤≤ nni . 
Let us advance that ( )  pkv inNsp ++= 1/' , where sk quantifies the number of occurrences 
of ),( yxFk in blocks ∈jB FPP, 1...1 2 ++≤= nnij . 
Because FPP is constructed from MOLS, its first n2 elements occur once in each group 
of n subsequent blocks tntt BBB +++ ,..., 21 , 2...3,2,,0 nnnnt = . Then, given a block index i, 
nni +≤≤ 21 , and a t-polynomial-set index k, 2nk ≤ , deriving its occurrence counter sk is 
trivial, i.e.  nisk /= . 
Furthermore, each element of the form jnk += 2 , 1...1 += nj , occurs n times in the group 
of blocks ( ) niB jni ...1,1 =−+ . In this case, ( )1−−= jnisk . 
Finally, the elements jnk += 2 , 1...1 += nj , of block 
12 ++nn
B occur for the n+1-th time 
within the FPP. 
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4.5 Analytical Performance Evaluation 
In this section we analytically21 assess the DPKPS and compare it with related schemes. 
4.5.1 Scalability 
Each block of FPP is used to accommodate up to ( )1/' +nN  different nodes and there are 
12 ++ nn  distinct blocks. Therefore, the number of nodes N that the DPKPS scheme can 
accommodate is given by: 
( ) ( )1/1' 2 +++≤ nnnNN      (Eq-2)  
4.5.2 DPKPS Resiliency 
The resiliency α of the DPKPS can be calculated as the number of nodes that a smart 
attacker needs to capture to compromise all the n2+n+1 t-polynomial-sets, i.e. to disrupt 
DPKPS security completely. 
Consider a first case where each t-polynomial-set of the DPKPS is used for no more 
than λ  nodes. In this case, the DPKPS exhibits perfect-resiliency (but the scalability is 
restricted to ( ) ( )1/12 +++λ≤ nnnN  (see Section 4.5.1). 
Now consider that each t-polynomial-set is used to pre-distribute i shares, '1 Ni ≤≤+λ . 
The attacker succeeds compromising the n2+n+1 t-polynomial-sets by getting λ+1 
shares ),()...,( 1,1, ypFypF bbbb +λ  evaluated at different points ', Fqp jb ∈ , kbjb pp ,, ≠ , kj ≠ , 
for 1...1 +λ=j , for each t-polynomial-set ),( yxFb , 1...1 2 ++= nnb . 
Two important properties of FPPs are used to further analyse the resiliency of the 
DPKPS: 
1. Any n+1 blocks with a specific element s in common contain the 12 ++ nn  
elements of the set S.  
Demonstration. Any specific element s appears in exactly n+1 blocks of the FPP 
and any two blocks of the FPP shares just one element in common [50]. Then, in 
n+1 blocks with element s in common, the number of no common elements is 
( )1+nn . By adding element s, we obtain the 12 ++ nn  elements of the set S. 
2. And, as a consequence of property 1., there are n2 blocks not containing a 
specific element s in common. 
Let ( )11 +≤+λ ni . Because t-polynomial-set shares are pre-distributed according to an 
FPP, the smart attacker22 needs to capture ( )( )11 ++λ n  nodes with the same specific 
t-polynomial-set ),( yxFs  to be able to recover all the keys. 
                                                 
21
 A practical evaluation is also presented in a later section. 
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To compromise ),( yxFs , a smart attacker needs to find λ+1 nodes carrying it. By 
choosing ),( yxFs  and capturing n+1 nodes carrying shares of it, in rings associated to 
n+1 different FPP blocks, the wise attacker can compromise ),( yxFs . In turn, he/she 
additionally gets n2+n t-polynomial-set shares ),( ypF bb , 1...1 2 ++= nnb , bs ≠ , evaluated 
at points 'Fqpb ∈ . 
By repeating the previous operation λ+1 times, capturing n+1 different nodes each time, 
the smart attacker gets ( ) ( )11 2 ++×+λ nn  t-polynomial-set shares ),(
,
ypF jbb , 
'
,
Fqp ib ∈ , kbjb pp ,, ≠ , kj ≠ , 1...1 +λ=j , 1...1 2 ++= nnb , and, thus, he can re-generate the 
n
2+n+1 t-polynomial-sets. 
In case ( )11 +>+λ ni , the smart attacker needs to capture a slightly increased number of 
nodes. In any case, the resiliency parameter (for the smart attacker case) can be 
approximated as23: 
( )( )11 ++λ=α nsmart     (Eq-3) 
Let us hereafter analyze the resiliency of the DPKPS under an unlucky oblivious24 
attacker. 
Assume each t-polynomial-set is used to pre-distribute i shares, '1 Ni ≤≤+λ  According 
to the n+1 blocks of the FPP with the same specific element s, i shares of ),( yxFs  and 
( )1+ni  shares of each ),( ypF bb , 1...1 2 ++= nnb , bs ≠ , are pre-distributed. 
Then, according to the n2 blocks of the FPP without the same specific element s 
( )1+− nii shares of each ),( ypF bb , 1...1 2 ++= nnb , bs ≠ , are pre-distributed. Note that the 
total number of shares distributed using the n2 blocks of the FPP without the same 
specific element s is then ( ) ( )( )12 +−+ niinn . 
Since every node carries n+1 distinct shares, the number of nodes carrying these shares 
is ( ) ( )( ) ( )112 ++−+ nniinn . 
Then, an unlucky oblivious attacker may need to capture up to 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1112 +λ+++−+ nniinn  nodes to compromise the DPKPS. Therefore, in the case 
of the unlucky oblivious attacker, the resiliency parameter is: 
( ) 112 +λ++=α nniunlucky  
In general, the resiliency parameter for a generic oblivious attacker is: 
                                                                                                                                               
22
 Recall that the smart attacker captures nodes selectively (see Chapter 2). 
23
 We will use ( )( )11 ++λ=α n  in the rest of the chapter. 
24
 Recall that the oblivious attacker captures nodes randomly (see Chapter 2). 
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unluckyoblivioussmart α≤α≤α  
More precisely, the resiliency of the DPKPS can be calculated as the fraction of total 
communications compromised when an oblivious attacker captures Nc nodes randomly, 
where λ>cN . 
Consider two arbitrary non-captured nodes u and v, which share one t-polynomial-set 
),( yxFs . Since at least λ + 1 nodes carrying ),( yxFs  need to be captured to compromise 
),( yxFs , the probability pc that the oblivious attacker can compromise the link between u 
and v is: 

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The equation of pc can be used to calculate the fraction of total communications 
compromised when Nc nodes are captured.  
To analyze how the parameters λ and n influence the resiliency of the DPKPS, we 
calculated the fraction of compromised communications as the number of compromised 
nodes grows (see Figure 14 where we considered a population of 1000=N  nodes and 
available memory space m equivalent to 125 keys). 
n=2, λ=40 n=13, λ=7n=22, λ=24 n=61, λ=1
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Figure 14: Fraction of compromised communications under oblivious attacker node captures 
( 1000=N , 125=m ) 
Figure 14 shows that the DPKPS exhibits a relatively long period of perfect resiliency 
for low values of n (and for relatively high values of λ). In these cases however, the 
transition from perfect resiliency to no resiliency rushes significantly around values of 
Nc close to m. 
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Consequently, configuration of the DPKPS with low value of n should be used in 
WAHN applications with high risk of node captures and relatively low scalability 
demands. 
Figure 14 also shows that a DPKPS with relatively high value of n exhibits a smooth 
transition from perfect resiliency to no resiliency when Nc grows. In these cases, the 
attacker needs to capture much more than m nodes to compromise 100% of the DPKPS 
t-polynomial-sets (Recall, for comparison, that the resiliency of Blundo KPS is limited 
to m nodes). However, in these cases, the period of perfect resiliency is almost 
inexistent. 
Consequently, this kind of configuration should be used in applications with low risk of 
node captures demanding huge scalability and computational efficiency. Additionally, it 
can be used in applications where nodes are provided of reliable tamper-resistant 
modules or where a certain fraction of compromised communications is tolerated. 
In the rest of the chapter, unless otherwise stated, α denotes the resiliency of a KPS 
against the smart attacker. 
4.5.3 Storage Cost  
Each node needs to store n+1 t-polynomial-set shares, which include t λ-degree 
bivariate polynomial shares over Fq’. 
Each polynomial share over Fq’ occupies λ+1 times the size of a partial key ( 'log q bits) 
and t of these polynomials λ+1 times the size of a pairwise key ( qlog bits). 
Then, 
( )( )11 ++= nm λ     (Eq-4) 
Additionally, each node must store its identifier. Let us analyze both the simple and the 
optimized node ID methods. 
In simple ID, a node ID is constructed by concatenating the identifiers of the n+1 
t-polynomial-set shares a node carries with the n+1 points in Fq’ where they are 
evaluated. The index of a t-polynomials-set can be codified in ( ) 1log 2 ++ nn  bits and a 
point of evaluation in ( )1'log −q  bits. 
Therefore, the size of a simple node ID in bits is given by: 
( ) ( )  ( ) [ ]1log1'log1 2 +++−+ nnqn     (Eq-5) 
The storage overhead contributed by the simple node ID is of significant relevance as n 
grows (see Figure 15), especially when compared to the memory size m in nodes. For 
instance, with 8'log =q  and 61=n , then (by applying equation Eq-5) ( ) 1240=IDsize bits. 
This ID size is equivalent to a 15.5 % of the memory occupied by t-polynomial-set 
shares when a memory 125=m  (8000 bits) is considered. 
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The optimized node ID is constructed by concatenating the identifier i of a block 
∈iB FPP, with a number mel , identifying an element within a Latin square meL , and with 
the number ip identifying the turn within Bi in the distribution of t-polynomial-set shares 
to u. 
Observe that the maximum number of different blocks ∈iB FPP is 12 ++ nn  and the 
maximum number of different nodes that can be accommodated following each block is 
( )1/' +nN . Additionally, the maximum number of different elements within a Latin 
Square meL  of order n is n. 
Thus, the size of the optimized node ID is: 
( )  ( ) ( )( )  ( ) nnqnn log1/1'log1log 2 ++−+++  
For the example previously mentioned, ( ) 19=optIDsize bits, which just corresponds to a 
0.95% of the memory 125=m . 
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Figure 15 Simple and optimized node IDs length 
4.5.4 Communication Cost 
The DPKPS needs to find which common t-polynomial-set share nodes u and v have in 
common. Note that, compared to other related KPSs [20]-[24], the DPKPS does not 
involve third-party nodes in the establishment of a common key Kuv. 
The rest of stages of the DPKPS do not demand further exchange of information 
between nodes. 
To establish a pairwise key in the DPKPS two arbitrary nodes u and v need to exchange 
the n+1 indices of their t-polynomial-set shares and the point where the common share 
is evaluated. This is simply achieved by exchanging nodes IDs. 
Using the simple method to generate IDs, both nodes need to 
communicate ( ) ( )  ( ) [ ]1'log1log12 2 −+++×+× qnnn  bits. 
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And, using the optimized node ID method, both nodes need to communicate 
( )  ( ) ( )( )  ( ) ( ) 2log1/1'log1log 2 ×++−+++ nnqnn bits. 
4.5.5 Computational Cost 
If simple node IDs are used in the DPKPS, only the generation of pairwise keys needs 
of computational effort from node nodes. 
To establish a pairwise key, a node needs to evaluate a t-polynomial-set share at the 
corresponding point of evaluation. The evaluation of a polynomial share over Fq’ 
requires λ modular multiplications and λ modular additions in Fq’ [19]. A 
t-polynomial-set includes t polynomial shares over Fq’. 
Therefore, the computational cost of generating a pairwise key can be approximated as: 
( )
''
__ qq
KeyGen FmultFaddtCCost +×λ×=  
If optimized node IDs are used, then nodes need to additionally compute operations to 
discover a common t-polynomial-set share and to derive the point of evaluation. First, 
generating a block of FPP from MOLS requires (at most) n additions and n 
multiplications in Fn. To find a common t-polynomial-set share, a node needs to 
generate and compare two FPP blocks. 
Then, neglecting the comparison operations, the computational cost of finding a 
common t-polynomial-set is approximated as: 
( )nneryShareDis FmultFaddnCCost __2cov +×=  
To find the t-polynomial-set share point of evaluation, a node needs to evaluate the 
formula ( )  pkv inNsp ++= 1/'  with normal arithmetic, where, depending a FPP block 
index i and a t-polynomial-set index k,  nisk /= , ( )1−−= jnisk , or 1+= nsk  (refer to 
Section 4.4.5.4). 
Then, for each case, the computational cost of finding a point of evaluation is 
approximated as: 
multdivaddCCost DerivationEvalPo ++= 22int  (case  nisk /= ) 
multdivaddCCost DerivationEvalPo 24int ++=  (case ( )1−−= jnisk ) 
multdivaddCCost DerivationEvalPo ++= 3int  (case 1+= nsk ) 
We demonstrate later in our practical analysis that eryShareDisCCost cov  and DerivationEvalPoCCost int  
are insignificant in practice (see Section 4.6.5). 
4.5.6 Existence and Security of Polynomials 
We cannot make q’ arbitrarily small (to adapt to the computational restrictions of low-
bit CPUs) and 12 ++ nn  arbitrarily large (to accommodate more nodes) without paying 
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off a decrease in security strength of the DPKPS (in general, of any KPS using multiple 
polynomials over Fq’). 
In this section we investigate for which λ, t, and n, the required number of polynomials 
over Fq’ exists without decreasing the security strength. 
To construct a λ-degree bivariate polynomial, the set-up server needs to randomly select 




 +
= 2
2λσ  values from Fq’ [19]. Since the field Fq’ contains q’ elements, each 
coefficient of a λ-degree bivariate polynomial over Fq’ can take up to q’ values. 
Therefore, the set-up server can choose up to φ different polynomials over Fq’ with σ 
coefficients: 
( )σ=φ 'q       (Eq-6) 
Because the t polynomials included in a t-polynomial set are randomly taken from a set 
with φ elements, an attacker trying to fake a t-polynomial-set corresponding to any of 
the 12 ++=γ nn  t-polynomial-sets of the DPKPS has a success probability: 
( )tsp φ×γ= /1     (Eq-7) 
4.5.6.1 Polynomials Security Condition 
The number φ has to be large enough to guarantee that 0→sp  for target values of n, or, 
equivalently, it is practically impossible to fake any t-polynomial-set used in the 
DPKPS.  
Let us assume that an attacker launches a brute-force attack to search a valid 
t-polynomial-set, similar to the one to break a symmetric key [52]. A symmetric key of 
128 bits is an accepted value offering enough security strength for the following 
decades [51]. We want to achieve similar security strength for any generated 
t-polynomial-set, i.e. an attacker needs decades to find a t-polynomial-set belonging to 
the DPKPS.  
Thus, 
( ) 1282/1/1 ≤φ×γ t  
Let us now assume that γ can be approximated as 2ψ. Then,  
( ) ψ+≤φ 1282/1/1 t     (Eq-8) 
Observe that fixed     'log/log0 qqtt == , then φ is a function of λ. Consequently, the 
polynomials security condition sets a lower bound on λ: 
( )( ) nttt ,,2/1/1 0min128 =λ≥λ⇔≤λφ ψ+     (Eq-9) 
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4.5.7 FPP Existence 
The DPKPS scheme solves the FPP existence problem of Çamtepe and Yener KPS 
[2][28] without the need to relax KPS connectivity by using the additional parameter q’ 
yet enforcing the polynomials security condition (in section 4.5.6.1). 
Assume we want, 15501= N target , 125≤m  and 64log =q . Then, equation Eq-4 imposes 
125<n . We can for instance choose 12' 8 +=q  ( 8'log =q bits, optimal25 for 8-bit CPUs). 
Then, equation Eq-2 imposes 61≥n  to obtain targetN N ≥≥ 15558 . We can try choosing the 
next prime power, i.e. 61=n , and see if 1=λ (imposed by equation Eq-4) satisfies the 
security condition. Note that 122≈γ and ( )3257=φ (by Eq-6). Thus, 1922/1/1 ≈φt , which 
fulfils the security condition 1402/1/1 ≤φt . 
From the previous example we can derive that, for optimal value 12' 8 +=q  and minimum 
value 1min =λ , the value of n can be chosen up to 322≈n  to fulfil the security condition. 
Thus, for practical values of n, the degree λ of the polynomials in the DPKPS can be 
chosen to be arbitrarily small without loss of security of polynomials. 
In conclusion, for an attacker capturing nodes may result a cheaper approach to 
compromise t-polynomial-sets than forging t-polynomial-sets. 
4.6 Practical Performance Evaluation 
In this section we experimentally assess the performance of the DPKPS on WAHNs of 
low-power resource-restricted AquisGrain wireless nodes.  
More specifically, we evaluate the DPKPS processes of t-Polynomial-Set Shares 
Discovery and Pairwise Key Establishment in terms of memory cost, bandwidth usage, 
computational cost as well as energy and time efficiency. 
In the first two subsections, we introduce our test-bed and our implementation of the 
DPKPS. The rest of subsections present the performance results derived from our 
experiments. 
4.6.1 Test-bed 
Our test-bed consists of a WAHN formed with two AquisGrain wireless nodes. 
AquisGrain [54][55] is a node developed at Philips Research Laboratories Aachen for 
low-power wireless body sensor network (BSN) applications. 
Figure 16 depicts the hardware components mounted on the main board of an 
AquisGrain. AquisGrain is provided with an ATmega128L low-power 8-bit micro-
controller. It also includes a 128 Kbytes of flash memory, a 4 Kbytes EEPROM and a 4 
                                                 
25
 A value 12' 16 +=q  can also be used while significantly improving scalability to the cost of a slight 
reduction of computational efficiency in the generation of keys. 
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Kbytes of SRAM. It is configured to work at a clock frequency of 7.4 MHz and it is 
sourced to a battery of 3 volt. 
 
Figure 16. AquisGrain 
AquisGrain uses the radio module CC2420 from Chipcon conforming the IEEE 
802.15.4 standard [56]. The radio offers a maximum data rate of 250 Kbps in the 2.4 
GHz frequency band and a typical range of 10 meters. The network layer complies the 
ZigBeeTM specification [57]. 
Because of its hardware and software configuration the AquisGrain wireless node is a 
good representative of the currently employed technology for wireless sensor nodes. A 
similar wireless sensor node (operating up to 8 MHz) is the MICAz mote developed by 
Crossbow. 
4.6.2 Implementation of the DPKPS 
The hardware characteristics of AquisGrain impose important restrictions in the 
implementation of the DPKPS. 
First, the computations must be suitable for an 8-bit CPU without division operation. 
Consequently, we implemented polynomials with coefficients of 8 and 16 bits, since 
divisions26 in 
182 +
F
 
or 
1162 +
F  can be computed without division operations [58]. We also 
implemented efficient algorithms to calculate modular operations in nF . 
Second, the DPKPS keying material and software stack must be of limited sizes. 
Consequently, we programmed efficient primitives to minimize the memory footprint. 
We developed a security software module in AquisGrain nodes, which implements the 
processes of t-Polynomial-Set Shares Discovery and Pairwise Key Establishment of the 
DPKPS. That is, the security module enables two AquisGrain nodes to discover the 
identifier of their common t-polynomial-set share, to derive the respective points of 
evaluation and to respectively generate a pairwise key. 
We developed a security protocol to discover t-polynomial-set shares and to establish a 
pairwise key. We also specified the packet format to communicate security modules in 
different AquisGrain nodes. The header of the security packet contains the following 
information: 
                                                 
26
 Required for modular operations. 
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1. Security Identifier. This field contains the identifier of the packet as belonging to 
the security module. 
2. Flow Control. This field identifies the security packets within the security 
protocol. 
The payload of the security packet contains one of the following contents: 
1. Sensor ID. This information is sent during the t-Polynomial-Set Shares 
Discovery phase. 
2. Acknowledgement. This information is sent to acknowledge the proper reception 
of security packets. 
The security packet is enclosed within the payload of a ZigBeeTM network (NWK) layer 
packet. 
To identify the sensors, we implemented the optimized node ID of the DPKPS. This 
implementation enables us to evaluate the computational overhead added by generating 
FPPs and polynomial evaluation points on AquisGrain nodes. 
The implemented generation of an FPP block automatically arranges the elements of the 
block in ascending order. To find the index k of the common t-polynomial-set shared by 
two AquisGrain nodes, the security module smartly searches through two sorted arrays 
containing the sorted elements of two FPP blocks. 
The process of searching works as follows. Consider the following two arrays A and B 
with elements sorted in ascending order (i.e. 1+< ii aa  and 1+< ii bb ): 
a1 a2 ak an an+1… …
b1 b2 bk bn bn+1… …
A
B
 
A and B have an element of same value at position k, which is unknown before the 
search algorithm runs. The search algorithm first indexes and compares the first position 
of both vectors: 
a1 a2 ak an an+1… …
b1 b2 bk bn bn+1… …
i=1
j=1
 
If ji ba <  or ji ba >  a new comparison is needed and, then, the index i or j is accordingly 
augmented a unit. This operation is repeated at most 2n times till the element kk ba =  is 
found: 
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a1 a2 ak an an+1… …
b1 b2 bk bn bn+1… …
i=k
j=k
 
The keying material, including the optimized node ID and t-polynomial-set share 
coefficients, is encoded in a vector. The first position of the keying material vector 
contains the ID and the rest of positions are sequentially occupied by the 1+λ  
coefficients of each of the 1+n  t-polynomial-set shares associated to that node ID. The 
keying material vector is loaded in the memory of a sensor and is eventually accessed 
by the security module on execution time. 
Note that because 
182 +
F
 
contains 128 +  elements, in order to codify t-polynomial-set 
share coefficients 9 bits are theoretically needed. Since AquisGrain memory spaces are 
multiples of 8 bits, a naïve implementation would require variables of 16 bits to codify 
each coefficient (this, in turn, would roughly double the memory requirements for 
keying material in respect to the theoretical analysis in Section 4.5.3). 
Observe however that the 9-th bit is set to 1 in just one element of the field, e.g. for the 
coefficient with value 128 + . In the rest of coefficients, namely 1 to 82 , the value of the 
9-th bit is to be set to 0. 
Consequently, we designed and applied a codification method in which all the 
coefficients are encoded in just 8-bit variables. The coefficients with value 1 and 128 +  
are both encoded with the 8-bit binary code 00000000. To differentiate between the 
coefficient 1 and 128 +  we used the bits of additional 8-bit variables (hereafter denoted 
as AVs), where each bit encodes the 9-th bit of a coefficient with binary code 
00000000. The order of bits within one of these AV variables corresponds to the 
occurrence of the code 00000000 within the keying material vector. 
Each AV variable is used to encode up to 8 occurrences of 00000000. Because in 
average a coefficient with value 1 or 128 +  occurs just once out of 128 +  stored 
coefficients, by using this method the memory usage in practice on nodes is m. 
Therefore, approaching its theoretical value. 
For our implementation with coefficients over 
1162 +
F  we applied the same codification 
concept. In this case, the value of the coefficients was encoded in 16-bit variables. The 
length of the AV variables, used to codify the 17-th bit of 1 and 1217 + , was just 8 bits. 
We also developed the Keying Material Generator, a JAVA application  that 
automatically generates the desired number of keying material vectors for 
user-introduced values of λ, n, logq and logq’. This program implements the 
functionality of the DPKPS set-up server. 
The length of the generated pairwise keys is 64 bits, both in our experiments with 8-bit 
and 16-bit polynomial coefficients. 
Chapter 4: Deterministic Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution 
85 
4.6.3 Memory Requirements 
The memory needs on an AquisGrain are divided in requirements of static and dynamic 
memory. Static memory is required to store the security software module and keying 
material. Dynamic memory is storage needed to store runtime variables during 
execution time. 
Table 3 quantifies in bytes the footprint of our implementation. The security software 
module occupies just a 1% of the available flash memory and runtime variables occupy 
just a 0.32% of the available SRAM. 
Naturally, the memory occupied by the keying material depends on the selected values 
for λ and n. For instance, for 11=n  and 9=λ  the keying material occupies nearly 1 
Kbyte, which results in just a 0.75% of the total static memory capacity (an acceptable 
value in AquisGrain nodes). 
Additionally, each AV variable adds one byte. In our experiments we found that the 
memory overhead from AV variables can be neglected. For instance, the expected 
number of bytes added from AV variables needed for 1 Kbytes of keying material is 1 
byte (in the 8-bit coefficient case) and 0 bytes (in the 16-bit coefficient case). 
Table 3. Memory Cost 
Security Item Memory Type Memory Cost (bytes)
Keying Material EEPROM 8(λ+1)(n+1)
Security Module FLASH 1416
Runtime Variables SRAM 13
 
In conclusion, from the memory overhead point of view the implementation of the 
DPKPS in AquisGrain nodes with 1 Kbytes keying material leaves 98% of the available 
static memory and 99.68% of the available dynamic memory for other data and software 
applications. 
4.6.4 Bandwidth Usage 
The bandwidth usage is calculated as the number of bytes exchanged by two 
AquisGrain nodes to establish a pairwise key. This number is calculated adding the 
length of two security packets with the overhead added by the ZigBeeTM layers. 
4.6.4.1 Security Packet Size 
In our implementation we restricted the amount of keying material to 1 Kbytes. 
Consequently, the value of n is at most 61. 
The header of the security packet is 2 bytes long. The first byte is used to identify the 
security module (among other applications running on the AquisGrain). The second 
byte is used for flow control. 
The payload of the packet includes the optimized sensor ID (refer to Section 4.4.5 for 
related theory) and is at most 4 bytes long. The first 12 bits are used to encode an FPP 
block identifier. In such case, the number of FPP blocks to codify is 3783, which can be 
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codified with 12 bits. The second 11 bits are used to encode the turn ip in the 
distribution of t-polynomial-set shares to a sensor. The number of turns is given by the 
formula 
1
1'
+
−
n
q
, which is maximized for 12' 16 +=q . Then, for 61=n , the maximum 
number of turns is 1057, which can be codified in 11 bits. The third 6 bits are used to 
encode an element of the Latin square Li from which Bi is derived. Since the number of 
elements of Li is 61=n , these elements can be encoded in 6 bits. The last 3 bits of the 
payload are left unoccupied. 
In conclusion, the aggregated maximum length of a security packet is 6 bytes. 
4.6.4.2 ZigBee/802.15.4 Headers Overhead 
In our implementation, two security modules communicate at the ZigBeeTM network 
(NWK) layer, i.e. a security packet is enclosed within the payload of the NWK packet. 
Consequently, the headers of ZigBeeTM NWK and lower layers must be considered to 
evaluate the bandwidth usage of our implementation. 
ZigBee/802.15.4 specifies a physical layer header of 6 bytes. The size of the MAC layer 
header varies from 5 to 13 bytes. 
Additionally, ZigBee/802.15.4 defines an optional MAC security header of 4 to 21 
bytes. The NWK header size varies from 2 to 13 bytes. 
In our experiments, we set the MAC and NWK headers to 23 and 6 bytes, respectively. 
The MAC address of each AquisGrain is a fixed value of either 2 or 8 bytes long. Since 
the maximum number of different AquisGrain nodes that can be configured using our 
implementation is 4064306, to cover this number we decided to set MAC addresses of 8 
bytes. 
The NWK address of each AquisGrain is a dynamic value of 2 bytes long, which is 
assigned to each AquisGrain in joining the WSN. The rest 4 bytes include flow control 
and error correction values. 
In conclusion, ZigBeeTM/802.15.4 headers add 35 additional bytes. 
4.6.5 Computational Cost 
The application of the DPKPS to establish pairwise keys exhibits nice features for 
WAHN security. The trade off is additional computational overhead on AquisGrain 
nodes. 
In the following subsections we quantify and assess the computational overhead of 
DPKPS functions demanding CPU computations. The results in the following 
subsections are presented in terms of CPU cycles of the ATmega128L. 
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4.6.5.1 Generation of t-Polynomial-Set Identifiers (from Optimized Node Identifier) 
To generate the n +1 identifiers of the t-polynomial-set shares stored in the AquisGrain, 
the security module computes from the optimized node ID the n +1 elements of an FPP 
block. 
A block iB  is generated using three different methods for the cases ni 21 ≤≤ , 
nnin +≤< 22  or 12 ++= nni  respectively (see Sections 4.4.5.2 and 4.4.5.3). 
Figure 17 depicts the computational cost of generating a block with the first two 
methods. In both cases, the cost is not significant for practical values of n. The cost of 
the third method is still more negligible and, thus, not depicted. 
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Figure 17. Computational cost of FPP block generation 
4.6.5.2 Search of Common t-Polynomial-Set 
Figure 18 depicts the computational cost for the best and worst search cases to find a 
common t-polynomial-set. 
The best case happens when the common element occupies the first position in both 
vectors containing t-polynomial-set identifiers. In such a case, the search algorithm 
finds the common element in the first round. 
Similarly, the worst case counts the case when the common element occupies the last 
position in both vectors. Consequently, the search algorithm finds the common element 
in the last round, which involves ( )12 +n  comparisons. 
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Figure 18. Computational cost of searching the index of a common t-polynomial-set 
4.6.5.3 Calculation of Point of Evaluation (from Optimized Node Identifier) 
Depending on the range of the index k of a t-polynomial-set and the index i of block iB , 
the evaluation point can be calculated using three different methods (see Section 
4.4.5.4). 
The implemented algorithm to calculate evaluation points uses 16-bit variables and it is, 
then, applicable for both the cases 82' =N  and 162' =N , and for n up to 216. 
The first and the second methods require just 300 and 480 CPU cycles, respectively. 
The computational cost of the last method is negligible. 
4.6.5.4 Generation of a Pairwise Key 
Figure 19 shows the computational cost of generating a 64-bit pairwise key with 
AquisGrain for increasing value of λ when 12' 8 +=q  or 12' 16 +=q . To provide an 
intuition of the depicted magnitudes, we compare with the cost of encrypting a 64-bit 
message using RC5 (RC5 encryption is extremely computationally efficient). 
Figure 19 shows that the cost of generating a pairwise key is equivalent to encrypting a 
64bit message with RC5-MAC when 5=λ  (case 12' 8 +=q ) and 4=λ  (case 12' 16 +=q ). 
Note that generating a 64-bit key takes approximately 4 times the cost of computing a 
16-bit partial key using polynomials over 
1162 +
F . Accordingly, it takes approximately 8 
times the cost of computing an 8-bit partial key using polynomials over 
182 +
F . 
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Figure 19. Computational cost of generating a pairwise key of 64 bits 
As Figure 19 shows, for λ in the range 1 to 100, a reduction of the degree of 
t-polynomial-sets over Fq’ can improve the computational efficiency on nodes up to 2 
orders of magnitude.In the DPKPS (as we show in sections 4.5.2 and 4.7) the value of λ 
can be chosen to be of small value while keeping the resiliency of the KPS a constant α. 
4.6.5.5 Aggregated Computational Cost 
Figure 20 and Figure 21 depict the total computational cost of calculating a 64-bit 
pairwise key resulting from t-polynomial-sets over 182 +F  and 1162 +F , respectively. Both 
pictures demonstrate that the cost of generating FPP blocks and evaluation points 
(depending on n) is negligible with the cost of generating a key from a t-polynomial-set 
(depending on λ). 
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Figure 20. Aggregated computational cost of generating an 8x8-bit pairwise key 
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Figure 21. Aggregated computational cost of generating a 4x16-bit pairwise key 
The conversion from CPU cycles C to time T is given by the following formula: 
T = C (cycles) /(Clock_Frequency (cycles/s) = C x 10-3/7.4 ms. 
Considering the clock frequency of 7.4 MHz, Figure 22 shows the time needed by an 
AquisGrain node to compute a pairwise key 4x16-bit. 
For 11=n  and 9=λ  the time of computation is lower than 1 ms. For 61=n  and 1=λ , 
the time of computation is slightly higher than 1 ms. WSN applications allowing delays 
up to 22 ms may implement DPKPS with values up to 103=n  and 80=λ  (naturally, if 
the memory of the sensors can allocate the drastic corresponding amount of keying 
material). 
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Figure 22. Aggregated time cost to generate a 4x16-bit pairwise key 
4.6.6 Energy Efficiency 
The energy consumption of the Atmega128L depends mainly on the operating voltage, 
clock frequency and temperature. 
Chapter 4: Deterministic Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution 
91 
At the frequency of 7.4 MHz, power supply of 3 V and temperature of 25 °C, the 
current consumption of the Atmega128L is approximately 8 mA (see Figure 23). 
 
Figure 23. ATmega128L Current Consumption at 8 MHz (Source [59]) 
The conversion from CPU cycles C to energy E is given by the following formula: 
E = C (cycles) x I (mA)/(Clock_Frequency (cycles/s) *3600(s/h)) = C x3x10-10 mAh 
The current consumption of the CC2420 radio module is 19.7 mA in reception (Rx) and 
17.4 mA transmitting (Tx) at the maximum power of 0 dBm [60]. Note that the CC2420 
consumes less power in Rx mode than in Tx mode, since the decoding operations in Rx 
are more complex than the encoding operations in Tx. 
The conversion from bits B transmitted/received in/from to energy E is given by the 
following formula: 
E = B (bits) x I (mA)/(Data Rate (bits/s) x 3600 (s/h)) 
, where I = 19.7 or 17.4 mA (Rx or Tx, respectively) 
Consider now that two AquisGrain nodes establish a pairwise key. Consider the 
AquisGrain node powered with an inexpensive 3-V coin cell battery of minumum 
capacity, just 30 mAh. 
Let us analyze thecase when 11=n  and 9=λ  (Recall a node would require less than 1 
kbytes for storing keying material). 
The energy consumed by each AquisGrain is the aggregate of the energy invested in 
exchanging sensor IDs with the energy used during the computation of a pairwise key. 
Since at the physical layer the AquisGrain node sends and receives two packets of 41 
bytes each (refer to Section 4.6.4), the energy spent in communication is 13.52 nAh. 
The energy spent in generating the key is only 5.75 nAh. 
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By investing only a 1% of its battery resource, the AquisGrain node can generate 15568 
different pairwise keys. Intuitively, by investing only a 1% of its battery the AquisGrain 
can generate a new pairwise key every hour during almost two years!  
In a mobile scenario, this allows a node to secure 24 new encounter with other nodes 
every day during nearly two years. Similarly, by dedicating a 10% of battery for 
security, a node can secure 240 encounters every day for the same time period. 
In conclusion, the DPKPS results drastically power efficient for pratical WAHN 
applications. 
4.7 Comparison with Deterministic KPS Schemes 
The DPKPS presents advantageous properties when compared with deterministic KPSs. 
In Table 4 and Figure 24 we compare the DPKPS scheme with previous deterministic 
KPSs [19][28] that also enable direct key establishment in terms of resiliency against 
node captures, scalability and revocability [30]. 
For comparison, the resiliency of a deterministic KPS is calculated as the minimum 
number of nodes that a smart attacker needs to capture to compromise all the pre-
distributed keys. The scalability of two deterministic KPSs can be compared in terms of 
the maximum number N of nodes that can be accommodated for the same resiliency 
level. A scheme with revocation enables the dynamic removal of a misbehaving or 
compromised node from the system. 
Because the DPKPS enables a node to be uniquely identified and authenticated, it also 
enables revocation of nodes (see column “R” of Table 4). Column “m” of Table 4 
shows the parameters to evaluate the memory m required by each KPS on a node. In the 
trivial (see Section 2.5.4), Blundo [19], combinatorial based on FPP [28] and DPKPS 
KPSs the resiliency level “α” is limited by the memory size m. In the trivial and 
combinatorial KPSs, the scalability “N” is also restricted by m. The scalability of 
Blundo’s27 KPS is restricted by the finite field prime order q’ where the polynomials are 
chosen from. The scalability of DPKPS5 is determined by both q’ and a fraction of m 
(see Figure 24, for n = m/2-1, 125=m , i.e. 1min =λ=λ , 12' 8 +=q . For simplicity’s sake, 
Figure 24 does not restrict n to prime powers). 
Table 4. KPS comparison 
KPS R m α N
Network Key No 1 1 Unlimited
Trivial Yes N-1 N-1 N
Blundo Yes λB + 1 λB + 1 q' -1
Comb-FPP No
 ≤nFPP + 1 nFPP + 1 (nFPP)2+nFPP+1
DPKPS Yes (λ+1)(n+1) (λ+1)(n+1) (q' -1)(n2+n+1)/(n+1)
 
                                                 
27
 We assume an implementation taking polynomials over Fq’ (for optimal computational efficiency) and 
mB =+λ 1 . 
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For the same resiliency level 125≤≈α m  and 12' 8 +=q , the DPKPS can accommodate 
more nodes than the rest of deterministic KPSs (See Figure 24). 
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Figure 24. Scalability of KPSs ( 12' 8 +=q ) 
Figure 24 shows that for 1282/' == Nm , both DPKPS and the combinatorial KPS based 
on FPP [28] can accommodate the same number of nodes whereas for 2/'Nm ≥  
combinatorial KPS can accommodate more nodes. 
In general, for ( ) 11/ −+λ= mn  and q’, both KPSs can accommodate the same number of 
nodes when a memory of size ( )1/' +λ≈ Nm  is considered in nodes. Consequently, 
choosing a larger value of q’ (i.e. N’), the DPKPS has a greater scalability for practical 
values of m. (see Figure 25). 
10
100
1000
10000
100000
1000000
10000000
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150
m
N
(lo
g 
sc
al
e)
Blundo Combinatorial DPKPS n=m/2-1, q'=65537
 
Figure 25. Scalability of KPSs ( 12' 16 +=q ) 
Since in the DPKPS and Blundo KPS nodes generate pairwise keys dynamically from 
polynomials, the computational cost of establishing a key is slightly higher than in any 
of the other deterministic KPSs discussed in this section. 
To establish a common key, the DPKPS and Blundo KPS mainly require modular 
operations in Fq’ while the rest of deterministic KPSs require searching the key in the 
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memory of the node. As we show in the practical performance evaluation (section 
4.6.5.1), generating a pairwise key in the DPKPS is extremely efficient in strictly 
constrained CPUs. 
Assume that using Blundo’s KPS we pre-distribute N’ shares of a λB-degree 
t-polynomial-set to exactly N’ nodes, where mB ≤+λ 1 . In the following, let 12' 8 +=q  
and 125=m . For comparison, now assume that we want to accommodate N’ nodes using 
the DPKPS. 
In such a case, we can choose '12 Nnn =++ , i.e. 42=n  (maximum supportable network 
size 4096), and assign each node to a different FPP block. The degree of the 12 ++ nn  
t-polynomial-sets is exactly ( ) 611 ≡−+≡λ nm . 
Alternatively, we can choose 2=n  and 40=λ  to accommodate the N’ nodes (but the 
maximum supportable network size is only 597 nodes). 
Using the previous parameters, Figure 26 compares the resiliency of Blundo’s KPS and 
the DPKPS under wise and naïve attacker models. 
DPKPS/Wise/n=2 DPKPS/Naïve/n=24 DPKPS/Naïve/n=2Blundo KPS
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Figure 26. DPKPS vs. Blundo’s KPS resiliency 
Figure 26 shows that by randomly capturing m nodes the attacker compromises 100% of 
the communications if Blundo KPS is used, whereas, if the DPKPS is used to 
accommodate exactly N’ nodes, the fraction of compromised communications is 81,7%. 
Observe that, under the naïve attacker model, for 6=λ  and 40=λ  perfect resiliency of 
the DPKPS is broken when approximately 40 and 80 nodes are captured, respectively. 
Observe that for equivalent perfect resiliency, a Blundo KPS with 39=λB  or 80=λB  
demands respectively 6 and 2 times more computational effort than the DPKPS (see 
Figure 19). Additionally, the DPKPS can accommodate much more nodes. 
4.8 Comparison with Random KPS Schemes 
The DPKPS presents advantageous properties when compared with random KPSs 
[20]-[24][26]. Firstly, the DPKPS enables direct pairwise key establishment. Then, 
improving random KPSs, any pair of nodes can establish a pairwise key with 
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independence of the WAHN size and the density of a node’s wireless neighborhood. 
The pairwise key can be used for node authentication and for protection of 
communications 
Secondly, since third-party nodes are not used for key establishment in the DPKPS, 
mediated key establishment using compromised nodes does not pose a security risk as 
in random KPSs. 
Thirdly, since DPKPS key establishment just involves the two nodes establishing the 
key, without the need to find and communicate with one or more trusted third-party 
nodes, the communication and computational overhead is also reduced in comparison to 
random KPSs. 
A smart attacker, who selectively captures nodes, is a realistic attacker model for key 
pre-distribution systems [32], especially in high security-sensitive applications (such as 
military). 
Let us first analyze and compare with key pool-based random KPS [20][21][24][26] 
under the smart attacker model. Assuming that the attacker captures nodes carrying 
different keys in their key rings, the resiliency of random key pool-based KPSs is 
reduced to kSKeyPoolsmart ≈α _ , where S denotes the number of keys in the initial key pool 
and k the number of keys in a node’s key ring (note that the maximum value of k is m). 
Recall that, in this case, the resiliency of the keys generated with the DPKPS is 
( )( ) mnDPKPSsmart =++λ=α 11_ . 
In random key pool-based KPSs, the probability p  that two nodes share at least one key 
is a function of S and k, and can be calculated after Eschenauer and Gligor [20]: 
( )( )
( ) !!2
!
1
2
 S kS
 kS
p
−
−
−=  
The formula of p shows that if we want two arbitrary nodes to be able to establish a 
common key with 1=p  (as in the DPKPS), then 1→kS . In other words, the random 
KPS tends to a system key KPS, and then DPKPSsmartKeyPoolsmart __ 1 α<<→α . Alternatively, we 
can set mkS DPKPSsmartKeyPoolsmart =α>≈α __ . In this case, the resiliency of a random KPS 
against the smart attacker is higher, but then p is reduced. 
Now we analyze and compare with polynomial (or similarly with Blom key-space) 
pool-based random KPS [23][22]. In this random KPS, a node carries s’ distinct 
polynomial shares and the initial pool contains s distinct polynomials. The resiliency of 
the KPS against the smart attacker is ( )1_ +λ=α sPolyPoolsmart  while the memory used in 
nodes is ( )1' +λ= sm . The probability p  that two nodes can directly establish a pairwise 
key is a function of s and s’, and can be calculated after Liu and Ning [23]: 
∏
−
−−
−=
−
=
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0
'1
s
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issp  
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The formula of p shows that if we want two arbitrary nodes to be able to establish a 
common key with 1=p  (as in the DPKPS), then ss →' . In other words, the random KPS 
tends to a Blundo KPS (where each node receives s’ shares of 'ss =  distinct 
polynomials). Consequently, ( ) msPolyPoolsmart =+λ→α 1'_ , which coincides with 
( )( ) mnDPKPSsmart =++λ=α 11_ . However, in such a case, the DPKPS can accommodate 
more nodes than the random KPS, i.e. 1'−= qN PolyPool  while ( )1'−≈ qnN DPKPS . Alternatively, 
we can let ( ) ms DPKPSsmartPolyPoolsmart =α>+λ=α __ 1 . In this case, the resiliency of a 
random KPS against the smart attacker is higher, but then p is reduced. 
4.9 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have presented the deterministic pairwise key pre-distribution 
scheme (DPKPS). The DPKPS enables security in WAHNs of strictly 
resource-constrained nodes. In an initial configuration phase a set-up trusted server 
pre-distributes keying material to WAHN nodes. Afterwards, any pair of nodes 
initialized with the DPKPS can directly establish a pairwise key in a extremely efficient 
manner. This property makes it equally suitable for full-connected or partially-
connected WAHNs of arbitrary membership size. 
The DPKPS keying material consists of a number of optimized Blundo’s polynomials. 
To optimize scalability, security robustness and energy efficiency, we use a 
combinatorial selection method to distribute a number of shares of different 
polynomials to each WAHN node. 
We have shown that for similar network resiliency level and memory usage, the DPKPS 
can accommodate a greater value of nodes than other deterministic KPS approaches 
without paying off a substantial energy overhead. Because the DPKPS enables direct 
key establishment between any pair of nodes of a system, it can be applied to WAHNs 
of static or mobile nodes and of arbitrary node population size and density. Random 
KPSs relax connectivity properties for network scalability or resiliency and, thus, they 
perform well only in static WAHNs. 
We have also derived a lower bound on the degree λ of the polynomials over Fq’ to 
guarantee their security while simultaneously optimizing their computational 
performance on constrained nodes. This result is applicable to other existing 
polynomial-based KPSs and, particularly, to the DPKPS. 
The DPKPS can be applied to provide security in networks of resource-restricted 
AquisGrain nodes. One application of special interest is the protection of medical 
BSNs, which are used for patient vital sign monitoring. In this context, the DPKPS 
enables the pre-configuration of trust relationships among potential medical wireless 
devices before they are actually used at the BSN. This setting further enables a clinician 
to attach or to associate two or more such devices and automatically create a patient 
BSN, without the need to actively configure security for that BSN. Because DPKPS-
based security is plug&play and user transparent, the clinician can exclusively focus on 
diagnosing the patient. 
Further work includes investigating approaches to increase the resiliency of the DPKPS 
without relaxing connectivity properties or increasing memory and energy cost. One 
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such approach may explore mechanisms to minimize correlation between keying 
material stored in nodes associated to the same FPP block. 
A key management infrastructure can be designed on the basis of the DPKPS. The key 
management infrastructure may be further extended with appropriate keying material 
update and revocation mechanisms. Because the ad hoc disconnected nature of MSNs, 
solving this functionality in this context results a complex problem [3]. 
Finally, the design of access control mechanisms, including role, group and user access 
control, in WAHNs of resource-constrained nodes is also a line of research yet to go. 
The DPKPS serves the basic identification and keying service on top of which access 
control services may in the future be defined. 
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5 Demonstrator for Medical Body Sensor Networks 
As proof of concept, we integrated our implementation of the DPKPS (see Section 
4.6.2) in a demonstrator for patient vital sign monitoring enabled by AquisGrain nodes. 
We have also shown the functionality of the DPKPS in typical patient monitoring 
scenarios. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1 we describe the context of medical 
monitoring with body sensor networks (BSN). Section 5.2 discusses models to employ 
the DPKPS for security in hospital BSNs. The demonstrator system is technically 
detailed in section 5.3. In section 5.4 we assess the feasibility of the DPKPS for typical 
medical BSN scenarios. Section 5.5 briefly summarizes and concludes the chapter. 
5.1 Medical Monitoring with Body Sensor Networks 
Continuous monitoring of vital signs (such as electrocardiogram (ECG), heart rate (HR) 
and pulse oximetry (SpO2)) is an essential element for the treatment of patients. 
For the physiological measurement of vital parameters, vital sign sensors need to be 
attached to the patient body. In the current status, sensors are typically wired to a 
bedside monitor for continuous display of patient's vital sign waveforms, numerics and 
alarms. This set-up ties patients to their beds, which is inconvenient for them. It also 
complicates work for caregivers since the wires hinder access to patients. In addition, 
the number and type of sensor nodes attached to the patient is strictly limited by the 
number and type of input wire ports at the display device. 
To solve the previous limitations and reduce the costs of caregiving in the future 
hospital, the wireless BSN will enable the acquisition, processing, storage and, when 
possible and/or needed, the transmission of the patient vital signs to a display device 
(see Figure 27). BSN nodes are inexpensive wireless sensor nodes with restricted 
data-collection, -processing and -storage as well as radio transmission capabilities. 
 
Figure 27. A body sensor network 
The sensor nodes are appropriately pre-configured to enable easy and quick set-up of a 
BSN. The clinicians will form a BSN just by placing (and subsequently adding or 
removing) wireless sensor nodes at the patient’s body, without any obtrusive 
configuration effort. These nodes are randomly selected from a pool with a large 
number of other nodes. Moreover, as long as batteries last, these nodes can be re-used 
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for subsequent patients without requiring software updates, i.e. they can be detached 
from an old patient and associated to a new patient. 
The patient will be free to move everywhere in the hospital. Eventually, a clinician will 
come at the patient’s vicinity (e.g. during the clinician round) and monitor the patient on 
his/her PDA (or a PBM). Note that any clinician at the hospital may appear on the 
patient vicinity and monitor the patient anytime. 
Security is of particular concern in BSN settings. BSNs are formed in public (and 
hostile28) areas where wireless communication may be monitored (see Figure 28). 
Additionally, sensor nodes may be subject to capture and manipulation by an adversary. 
Particularly, in hospitals access to BSNs (this comprises device association to a BSN 
and data access) must be restricted to authorized hospital entities (including medical 
sensors, devices and clinicians). 
 
Figure 28. The need for security in BSNs 
Because of the system limitations, operational demands and security risks discussed in 
former paragraphs, medical BSNs require low-power low-cost effective security 
services of authentication, communication confidentiality and integrity as enabled by 
the DPKPS. 
5.2 DPKPS Use Models in the Hospital 
There are two options to set DPKPS-enabled security in a hospital, which differ in the 
entity administering security. 
In the first (and recommended) option, the Biomedical Engineer (BioEng) - an engineer 
being responsible for all the medical equipment in the hospital - configures security in 
the new wireless medical equipment after purchasing it. 
Initially, the software of the medical equipment includes a security module (similar to 
that of Section 4.6.2) and no keying material. Consequently, the hospital needs to buy a 
Keying Material Generator to configure security on wireless medical equipment. The 
Keying Material Generator is to be installed in a set-up server, e.g. a PC used for set-up 
purposes. 
                                                 
28
 e.g. in military applications. 
Intruder PDA 
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To configure security, the BioEng shall first estimate the number of medical devices to 
be set-up with DPKPS keying material as well as the potential number of medical 
devices to be purchased in successive orders. For instance, assume that the total number 
of medical devices purchased and to be purchased is 100000 and that the number of 
currently purchased devices is 1000. Then, by using the Keying Material Generator, the 
BioEng sets the parameters of the DPKPS to enable the generation of keying material to 
configure at least 100000 devices. In this point in time he just generates and loads 
keying material vectors to the first 1000 purchased devices.  
The keying material shall be loaded under strict security measures to avoid that an 
attacker may learn the keying material. For instance, if keying material is downloaded 
using in-band mechanisms, then the wireless transmission shall be confined to a highly 
restricted physical area. 
After security configuration, the BioEng deploys the new 1000 wireless medical devices 
in the hospital, i.e. he distributes them among different hospital departments and 
clinicians. The clinicians can now form secure BSNs with any combination of the 1000 
devices. 
Imagine now that the BioEng orders 999 additional medical wireless devices. Because 
the Keying Material Generator stores the parameters of the initial security configuration, 
the BioEng can configure in the new 999 devices DPKPS keying material that is 
different yet interoperable with keying material loaded in the first 1000 devices. 
Consequently, the new 999 and the old 1000 can now establish secure BSNs formed 
with any combination of the 1999 devices. 
The second option is targeted at hospitals without a BioEng (we discourage it in 
hospitals with a BioEng). The medical equipment provider (MEP) assumes the 
responsibilities of a security administrator for its customers. For each customer, the 
MEP estimates the total number of devices to be delivered (possibly, also in successive 
orders) and installs DPKPS keying material during production. To avoid mixing up 
security domains of different hospitals, the keying material installed in devices 
delivered to two different customers shall be uncorrelated. 
Note that with this second option the MEP can offer a complete plug&play and secure 
solution, i.e. new medical equipment can directly be deployed in the hospital without 
the need for security configuration efforts from hospital personnel. The wireless medical 
devices can establish secure BSNs. 
From the hospital perspective, the disadvantages of this second option lie first on the 
need to unconditionally trust the MEP as a security administrator and, second, on the 
impossibility to autonomously manage the DPKPS keying material of its medical 
devices. For instance, to update DPKPS keying material from the medical devices, the 
hospital needs to hire the MEP as a security administrator. 
5.3 Demonstrator System 
We run the JAVA-based Keying Material Generator to generate DPKPS keying 
material in a normal computer, which simulates the DPKPS set-up server. 
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Furthermore, we integrated our implementation of the DPKPS in a demonstrator for 
patient vital sign monitoring developed for the "Cableless Patient" project at Philips 
Research Laboratories (Aachen). 
Figure 29 depicts the protocol stack used for the security demonstrator. The DPKPS is 
placed in each AquisGrain on top of the ZigBeeTM NWK layer. On top of the DPKPS 
we implemented a simple authentication protocol. The top of the stack includes ECG, 
SpO2 and display applications. The ECG and the SpO2 applications generate simulated 
ECG and SpO2 data, respectively. Only after successful authentication, ECG, SpO2 and 
vital sign display applications are allowed to intercommunicate. 
ZigBee NWK
DPKPS
802.15.4 MAC & PHY
Authentication
ECG SpO2 Display
 
Figure 29. Protocol stack used for demonstrator 
Two laptops, which simulate either PBMs or clinician PDAs, run the vital sign display 
application. The laptop is connected via the serial port interface to an AquisGrain node. 
Two additional AquisGrain nodes run the ECG application. The third AquisGrain runs 
the SpO2 application. 
Figure 30 shows a possible configuration of the demonstrator with a laptop and one 
ECG AquisGrain and the SpO2 AquisGrain. 
Display
Laptop
AquisGrain
RS-232
ECG
AquisGrain
SpO2
AquisGrain
ZigBee
Wireless
 
Figure 30. A possible configuration of the demonstrator 
5.4 Feasibility and User Satisfaction 
The goal of our demonstrator is to intuitively show the feasibility and benefits of using 
DPKPS-enabled security in the hospital. We also use it to evaluate the performance that 
the human user perceives on using the system. The evaluated parameters include 
simplicity, timeliness, transparency, and efficacy. 
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In the following, we briefly describe the demonstrated scenarios: 
 Security configuration. The goal of this demonstration is showing the process of 
configuring DPKPS keying material in a hospital context. The demonstration 
also shows the simplicity of configuring DPKPS security for a security 
administrator (no mathematical background is needed). 
The demonstrator system includes the desktop and the two ECG AquisGrain 
nodes. The ECG AquisGrain nodes include a security software module. 
During the demonstration we show a BioEng generating DPKPS keying material 
with the Keying Material Generator. The desktop loads the corresponding 
keying material vector in each ECG AquisGrain using an RS-232 serial port 
interface. 
 Secure sensor data communication. The goal of this demonstration is showing 
the motivation for security in a hospital context. It also shows the property of 
user-transparent (or unobtrusive) and effective security. 
The demonstrator system consists of a laptop in the role of a clinician PDA and 
the ECG and SpO2 AquisGrain nodes. The clinician PDA and the ECG belong 
to the hospital and, then, have been initialized by a BioEng with DPKPS keying 
material. The ECG AquisGrain simulates a legitimate sensor attached to the 
patient body. The SpO2 simulates an intruder trying to send bogus SpO2 
measurements. The SpO2 does not carry valid keying material. Figure 31 depicts 
the simulated medical scenario.  
 
Figure 31. Intruder trying to impersonate a sensor node attached to the patient 
We run two security modes: security off and security on. In the security off mode 
no security mechanisms are activated and, thus, the demonstrator shows the 
intruder succeeding in sending a false SpO2 measurement of 20%. False SpO2 
data together with legitimate ECG data is associated to the patient and displayed 
on the clinician PDA. Consequently, because a SpO2 of 20% is a value showing 
bad health status, the clinician may conclude a wrong diagnosis for the patient. 
Clinician PDA 
Intruder Sensor 
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In the security on mode, since the intruder SpO2 AquisGrain is not provided of 
legitimate keying material, it cannot successfully pass the authentication check 
and, consequently, the false SpO2 measurements are rejected and not displayed 
by the clinician PDA. The legitimate ECG AquisGrain node succeeds the 
authentication checking and, therefore, is allowed to send ECG data. The ECG 
signal of the patient is then displayed on the clinician PDA. 
 Clinician rounds. The goal of this demonstration is showing security 
interoperability and flexibility of sensors, PBMs and PDAs belonging to the 
same security domain. It also shows the property of time efficient security. 
In this scenario we use two laptops and two ECG AquisGrain nodes. The first laptop 
takes the role of a legitimate PBM and the second, of a legitimate clinician PDA. Both 
ECG AguisGrain nodes simulate legitimate ECG sensors. The first AquisGrain is 
attached to patient Heribert and, the second, to patient Oscar. 
We run this demonstrator in the security on mode. Clinician David, carrying his 
PDA, visits patients Oscar and Heribert. Clinician Karin, carrying a PBM, visits 
the same patients. The demonstrator shows the clinicians monitoring the patient 
vital signs in the different combinations BSN configurations. That is, 
(considering a BSN per patient) PDA↔ECG1 and PBM↔ ECG1; 
PBM↔ECG2 and PDA↔ ECG2; PBM, PDA↔ECG1; and PBM, PDA↔ 
ECG2. 
 
Figure 32. Scenario involving multiple patients and clinicians 
Successful display of vital signs means successful generation of pairwise keys 
and authentication. The secure communications are established without apparent 
delays for the clinician. 
The following scenarios, to further demonstrate more features enabled by the DPKPS, 
could be easily shown by slightly extending the current demonstrator: 
 Fine-grained Clinician Access Control. The goal of this demonstration is 
showing clinician personalized access control. 
Doctor PDA 
Nurse PBM 
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During the patient set-up medical procedures a set of sensors are initially configured 
and attached to the body of a sensor. Included in this set-up, a group of authorized 
clinician identities can be configured on sensors. Clinician identities shall be associated 
to DPKPS node IDs. 
Now imagine the patient is wearing the legitimate sensors and a clinician 
approaches with a legitimate PDA. Only in the case that the clinician belongs to 
the group of users allowed to treat that patient, he will be able to display the vital 
signs of that patient. 
 Patient @home. The goal of this demonstration is to show the scalability and 
flexibility of the DPKPS and also potential usage scenarios beyond the hospital. 
A patient has been treated at the hospital. For instance, he has recovered from a 
recent heart attack. He is ready to go home but still some of his vital signs (e. g., 
ECG and SpO2) need to be monitored. 
The hospital provides the patient of a care box containing a set of sensors (ECG 
and SpO2sensors in our example) and a patient storage/relay device (e.g. a 
UMTS-enabled mobile phone). The patient storage/relay device can be used to 
regularly store and/or to online relay vital signs. The sensors and the patient 
storage/relay device have been previously configured within the hospital 
security domain, i.e. with DPKPS keying material.  
Once at home, the patient (or helped by an assistant) can simply attach the 
sensors to his body to automatically (plug & play) set-up a BSN. Subsequently, 
vital signs of the patient are monitored while the patient lives his quotidian life. 
The BSN is protected with security mechanisms, i.e. sensors and devices of the care box 
establish encrypted and authenticated communications. Then, no intruder can violate 
patient privacy or safety. 
Occasionally, a clinician comes from the hospital to visit the patient. He carries 
any PDA, which has been also initialized in the hospital security domain. By 
using the PDA, the clinician can also securely connect to the BSN and monitor 
the current vital signs of the patient. He may also check the patient vital signs 
history of the previous days. 
Additionally, the clinician may bring new sensors from the hospital and attach 
them to the patient’s body. This new sensor can establish secure connections 
with old sensors at the BSN, with the patient storage/relay device and with 
clinician PDAs. 
The same scenario can be extended to various patients being monitored at home. 
5.5 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have presented the application of DPKPS to provide security in 
medical BSNs of resource-restricted nodes. 
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In the medical context, the DPKPS enables the pre-configuration of trust relationships 
among potential medical wireless devices before they are actually used at the BSN. 
Further, this setting enables a clinician to attach or to associate two or more such 
devices and automatically create a patient BSN, without the need to actively configure 
security for that BSN. 
Because DPKPS-based security is plug&play and user transparent, the clinician can 
exclusively focus on diagnosing and caring the patient. 
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6 Conclusions and Future Work 
A WAHN is a collection of autonomous nodes that communicate with each other by 
forming a single-hop or, often multi-hop, wireless network and maintaining 
connectivity in a decentralized manner. The network topology is in general dynamic, 
because the connectivity among the nodes may vary with itinerating, quitting and 
joining nodes. 
To protect WAHNs against malicious attackers, WAHNs must be provided of 
authentication, confidentiality and integrity services. Further security services, including 
user access control and non-repudiation services, may be required by particular WAHN 
applications. 
Performance-aware key management must fundament security services in WAHNs. The 
WAHN key management service must enable any pair of nodes to establish a key with 
independence of dedicated security servers, adapting to WAHN dynamics and using 
cryptographic primitives and protocols adequate to WAHN node resource restrictions. 
The HKMI presented in this thesis enables energy-efficient direct key establishment for 
subsequent use in authentication or confidentiality and integrity services. The HKMI 
also supports non-repudiation services based on public key cryptography. A PKI 
underlying the HKMI is used to set-up initial trust of nodes in the WAHN and, thus, 
generate a random trust graph connecting all the nodes of the WAHN. Nodes of the 
shortest trust path connecting two end nodes cooperate to securely distribute trust 
information and symmetric keys to the end nodes. 
The HKMI can be applied to support efficient security in applications using relatively 
dynamic WAHNs of moderate-resource nodes. For instance, the HKMI can be used to 
protect a WAHN composed of various medical portable wireless actuators around a 
patient. In such scenario, a potential intruder fails HKMI-enabled authentication 
verification and, thus, cannot maliciously trigger any actuator. Additionally, because the 
HKMI supports non-repudiation, the identity of the clinician triggering or setting an 
actuator is unequivocally registered. 
However, because the HKMI is based on public key cryptography, the same solution 
cannot be applied to WAHNs including extremely resource-constrained nodes. In such a 
case, key management must be based on lightweight symmetric key cryptography.  
The DPKPS presented in this thesis enables lightweight pairwise symmetric key 
establishment in WAHNs of strictly resource-constrained nodes. In an initial set-up 
phase a trusted server stores keying material to the nodes. The keying material consists 
of a number of optimized Blundo’s polynomial shares arranged according to a 
combinatorial distribution. The combinatorial distribution guarantees that any two 
nodes carry shares of a common polynomial. Blundo’s polynomials provide for node 
authentication.  
Afterwards, on deploying the nodes in one (or more) WAHN(s) any pair of nodes 
initialized with the DPKPS can directly establish a pairwise key without the need for the 
trusted server to be online.  
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The DPKPS exhibits excellent scalability, security and energy-efficiency properties. It 
can be applied to WAHNs of static or mobile nodes and of arbitrary node population 
size and density. One such application is the protection of medical BSNs for patient 
vital sign monitoring. In this context, the DPKPS enables plug&play and clinician 
transparent yet effective security in BSNs. A potential intruder cannot modify any 
patient vital sign data transferred at the BSN. 
Future work includes investigating approaches to increase the resiliency of the DPKPS 
without relaxing connectivity properties or increasing memory and energy cost. One 
such approach may explore mechanisms to minimize correlation between keying 
material stored in nodes associated to the same FPP block. 
A key management infrastructure can be designed on the basis of the DPKPS. The key 
management infrastructure may be further extended with consistent keying material 
update and revocation mechanisms. Because the ad hoc disconnected nature of MSNs, 
solving this functionality in this context results a complex problem. 
Furthermore, the design of access control mechanisms, including role, group and user 
access control, in MSNs is also a line of research yet to go. The DPKPS serves the basic 
identification and keying service on top of which access control services may in the 
future be defined. 
Finally, a WAHN may be formed of devices of diverse resource capability. For 
instance, a medical WAHN may be composed of a combination of mains-powered 
devices, portable devices and actuators, and sensors. In this network setting, the HKMI 
and the DPKPS can be combined within a unified key management architecture. The 
DPKPS can be used to cover security for sensor-to-any communication and the HKMI 
to protect communication among more powerful devices. Further work in this line 
involves the development and testing of such architecture in real WAHN products. 
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DPKPS: Deterministic Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme. 
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HKMI: Hybrid Key Management Infrastructure. 
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ID: Node Identifier. 
KPS: Key Pre-distribution Scheme. 
MOLS: Mutually Orthogonal Latin Squares. 
MSN: Mobile Sensor Network. 
PBM: Portable Bedside Monitor. 
PDA: Personal Digital Assistant. 
PGP: Pretty Good Privacy. 
PKC: Public Key Cryptography. 
PKI: Public Key Infrastructure. 
SBIBD: Symmetric Balanced Incomplete Block Design. 
SKC: Symmetric Key Cryptography. 
TKD: Trust and Key Distribution Protocol. 
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TL: Trust Level. 
TP: Trusted Portal. 
TTP: Trusted Third Party. 
WAHN: Wireless Ad Hoc Network. 
WSN: Wireless Sensor Network 
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